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Recent efforts toward a Darwinian psychology of human behavior will profit from 
taking account of prior investigations of proximate phenomena and adaptive mecha- 
nisms conducted within the science of biology, and from realizing that adaptive sig- 
nificance and underlying mechanisms must be investigated in concert. Contrary to some 
recent arguments, evidence of adaptive design is usually manifested initially and most 
prominently in the behavior (or other “ultimate” phenotypic expressions) of organisms, 
human or nonhuman, rather than in underlying psychological, physiological, or de- 
velopmental mechanisms, which are often obscure, and in any case, as adaptive mech- 
anisms, must be investigated secondarily. The reason is that selection acts most directly 
on behavior, and on its underlying mechanisms only as they influence the behavior. 
This is as true for learned and cultural behaviors as for any others. Adaptive significance 
of behavior, and evidence of its underlying design, is thus examined only by studying 
the behavior itself, its complexity, the situations in which it is expressed, and its effects 
in different situations. Biological mechanisms of any kind cannot even be identified 
with confidence, or understood, until, at the least, reasonable inferences have been 
made about their adaptive functions, what they are, as mechanisms, designed by se- 
lection to accomplish. Moreover, what appear to be adaptive psychological, physio- 
logical, or other mechanisms, may, as with some expressions of behavior, be incidental 
effects of still other mechanisms that are adaptive. 
Adaptation is not restricted to situations in which genes program specifically for 
particular behavioral alternatives: natural selection of alternative alleles may also yield 
abilities and tendencies to engage in conditional strategies, to assess costs and benefits 
in directly or indirectly reproductive terms. In humans, such cost-benefit assessments 
may be conducted entirely through mental scenario-building, or even through absorbing 
and judging the mental scenarios of others, without either admission or cognizance of 
the reproductive significance of the assessment. The goals actually sought may be sec- 
ondary, tertiary, or even more distantly removed correlates of reproductive success 
(e.g., status or reputation, which may correlate with power, which may correlate with 
wealth, which may correlate with access to the resources of reproduction); reproductive 
success itself may be a concept alien to the actor’s conscious motivations, even denied 
vehemently as a goal. In learned and cultural behaviors, selection has to be not only 
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for the ability to learn but for its patterning, such as for the machinery enabling de- 
velopment of the ability to learn to make appropriate (cultural) decisions. 
Kin recognition is reviewed as the most prominent example of a set of extensively 
studied adaptive mechanisms involving learning, and as a central problem with respect 
to adaptiveness in social behavior. Arguments that the adaptive mechanisms collected 
under the concept of learning evolve as special, rather than general-purpose devices. 
raise provocative questions about the evolution of ontogenetic and physiological prepa- 
ration to deal with environmental novelty, especially in complex social interactions. 
Evolution of the human psyche, especially its conscious aspects, is briefly discussed as 
a problem in understanding the history of sociality. It is argued that the principal 
environment of natural selection leading to the modern human psyche was social, and 
that on this account the environment of human behavior has not changed as much since 
the Pleistocene as is often assumed. 




harles H. Waddington (1956) may have been the first to use the 
Aristotelian term “epigenesis” . m the modern sense, referring to 
all events by which the zygote is transformed into an organism 
and then continues to function throughout life; literally, whatever 
is built on the genetic materials. Lumsden and Wilson (1981) coined the 
phrase “epigenetic rules” to focus attention on elucidating laws, principles, 
or mechanisms that underlie adaptive phenotypic outcomes. Cosmides and 
Tooby (1987) used the more explicity adaptive term “Darwinian algorithms” 
for the same phenomena. Rozin (1976) called them “adaptive specializa- 
tions,” and Johnston (1982b) used the term “special purpose epigenetic sys- 
tems.” In each case the authors were trying to generate a view of ontogeny, 
physiology, and learning-all the events of somatic and reproductive effort 
that underlie adaptive outcomes-which makes explicit the assumption that 
they have been designed by natural selection as mechanisms whereby the 
organism tends to maximize its inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964) in the 
environments of history. 
All of these authors were also trying to generate an evolutionary ap- 
proach to psychology, or an evolutionary psychology (also see Ghiselin, 
1973; Johnston, 1982a; Gould, 1982, 1986; Barkow, 1984, 1988; Tooby, 1985; 
Tooby and Cosmides, 1988; Cosmides and Tooby, 1988; Symons, 1987, 
1988). They were trying to apply Darwinian arguments to the proximate 
mechanisms of human and animal behavior. In this effort they follow Wil- 
liams (1966), who, in developing the modern view of evolutionary adaptation, 
argued extensively for the search for design in the mechanisms underlying 
adaptation and evolved function: “One should never imply that an effect is 
a function unless he can show that it is produced by design and not by 
happenstance” (p. 261). 
These various authors also seek to bridge what Waddington called the 
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“great gap in biology,” the chasm that separates the study of adaptive phe- 
notypic outcomes as the “ultimate” causes of the evolutionary biologist 
from, eventually, knowledge of the genetic materials and their primary prod- 
ucts. They are trying to discover a manageable set of generalizations that 
will help connect the organism to the myriad of underlying genetic and 
environmental influences that created it, that will describe the makeup 
and history of underlying traits of organisms as the “proximate” causes or 
mechanisms of adaptive phenotypic outcomes. There is irony in the fact that 
many of these pioneering efforts are being initiated to help analyze human 
behavior, and to change a social science that has long been too independent 
of biology. Although efforts by behavioral biologists to develop learning and 
other ontogenetic models to explain the behavior of nonhuman organisms 
are more extensive than seems generally appreciated (for reviews, see Rozin, 
1976: Johnston, 1982a, b; Gould, 1982, 1986; Marler and Terrace, 1984; 
Holmes and Sherman, 1983; Sherman and Holmes, 1985; Alcock, 1989), the 
parts of the biological sciences concerned with ontogeny, physiology, and 
related topics (often called “organismic” biology today) have generally 
failed to view epigenesis as a problem in adaptive (reproductive) design. To 
a certain extent, one might say that psychology has developed viewing the 
human organisms as a “happiness” (or pleasure) machine, whereas devel- 
opmental and physiological biology has tended to think of organisms as “sur- 
vival” machines. Evolutionary biology, on the other hand, stipulates that 
unless organisms are most appropriately viewed as reproductive machines, 
its basic postulates are wrong. I 
Nevertheless, as I shall show, for what is now being called Darwinian 
psychology to ignore the long history within biology of extensive study of 
the underlying mechanisms of behavior-studies that in some cases have 
focused on evolutionary adaptiveness for more than two decades (e.g., kin 
recognition: see later and Sherman and Holmes, 1985; Fletcher and Mich- 
ener, 1987) would simply be a new way for human-oriented scientists to 
neglect information of central significance to their projects. There can be 
no doubt that all of the aforementioned authors, although they often do not 
cite one another, are discussing the same set of problems. All epigenetic 
rules are Darwinian algorithms and all Darwinian algorithms are epigenetic 
rules. Every ontogenetic sequence includes physiological mechanisms and 
every physiological mechanism is part of an ontogenetic sequence. It is 
misleading to argue that the focus should be on underlying mechanisms of 
’ One reader argued that my characterization of psychology as viewing the human organism as 
a happiness machine is wrong, that psychology is better described as viewing humans as in- 
formation-processing machines, or computer-like. Such a view, however, cannot evade the 
problem of why some kinds of information are accepted, others rejected; why some kinds of 
information are sought and savored, others avoided or forgotten. Any science that stops short 
of seeking ultimate functions (the organismic biologists’ “ survival” qualifies here, even if in- 
complete or wrong) is stuck with labels like “happiness” or “pleasure” for the mechanisms 
that result in the seeking and repeating of some outcomes and the rejection or avoidance of 
others. Unlike computers, organisms have no possibility of being viewed as neutral with respect 
to the selection of information to process. 
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behavior rather than on the behavior itself; to imply that mechanisms can 
(ought to) be studied independent of, or prior to, observations of behavioral 
outcomes and hypotheses concerning adaptive significance (what such 
mechanisms are designed to do); and to ignore the fact that complexity 
alone-in behavior as well as its proximate mechanisms-indicates evolu- 
tionary (adaptive) design (Williams, 1966), even when the question “design 
for what?” has not yet been answered (cf. Symons, 1987, 1988).* To maintain 
progress in the understanding of human behavior, information about a) the 
historical and reproductive significance of specific acts of behavior and b) 
their underlying morphological, physiological, and developmental designs 
must continually be played against one another; neither can be ignored. We 
must learn how to do this, and remind ourselves to do it. To do it best we 
must combine contributions from all relevant disciplines. 
This issue is not trivial, for it involves everyone’s concepts of how 
changes in genes might result in changes in the behavior of humans during 
evolution, and in what fashions or to what extents those changes may le- 
gitimately be said to be products of evolution by natural selection. This is 
the only route to understanding development, physiology, and morphology- 
the phenotype, the proximate mechanisms of behavior, learning, and all of 
* A reader questioned this statement, referring to Gould and Lewontin (1979), and noting that 
“complex structures, like the spandrels of San Marco, can be epiphenomenal. Thus, you must 
also demonstrate function .” But spandrels are not in themselves complex; they are simply 
the spaces between arches. The decorations and other modifications of spandrels are complex. 
Gould and Lewontin carefully avoided saying that the complex uses of spandrels are not func- 
tional. Instead, they said that the complex appearance of what has been placed inside spandrels 
might cause us to use spandrels as “starting points ” in the analysis of function, presumably 
(in our ignorance or naivete) of arches or ceilings or even cathedrals. 1 don’t think people, even 
ardent adaptationists, are typically so naive, and I am unable to imagine what is wrong with 
starting with the decorations of spandrels in understanding the function of those decorations, 
which is what adaptationists do with the traits of living creatures. All traits (and functions) of 
living creatures are epiphenomenal, in the sense that they represent modifications of some pre- 
existing condition-a derivation from last year’s model. Evolution is an endless succession of 
such epiphenomenalities. Selection, after all, can only operate on last year’s model, regardless 
of what last year’s model did or where it came from. In this sense we cannot examine any 
aspects of living creatures except as epiphenomena. As soon as selection starts changing and 
complexifying traits, however, they automatically cease being mere/y epiphenomena. Even 
Gould and Lewontin admit that selection is the principal guiding force of evolution, so this kind 
of change is what tends to happen to every instance of epiphenomenality-every trait that 
persists. That is why it is parsimonious to assume that complexity is sufficient evidence of a 
background of selection-evidence that the trait under consideration is produced by either direct 
or indirect selective action-just as the complexity of what has been done with the spandrels 
of San Marco is evidence of functionality, and therefore not only an adequate starting point 
for the understanding of its own significance but the only logical starting point. Moreover, 
cathedrals and arches and spandrels appear to be the worst possible example for Gould and 
Lewotin’s insistence that it is inept to explore functions of the parts (spandrels, traits) of larger 
phenomena (cathedrals, organisms). This particular tirade of Gould and Lewontin against the 
investigation of adaptiveness has always seemed to me a wonderful recipe for the confusion of 
reasons for origins of traits and reasons for their maintenance and elaboration; and in my opinion 
their subsequent arguments on many aspects of living creatures continue to demonstrate that 
they suffer from precisely this kind of confusion (thus, S. J. Gould, 1987, argues that the clitoris 
of the human female is probably functionless because it originated as a homologue of the male 
penis, and S. J. Gould, 1981, suggests that the enlarged genitalia of the female spotted hyena 
are probably functionless because this condition correlates with an increased titer of testos- 
terone in females; etc. (See Alcock, 1987; Sherman, 1988; and see West Eberhard, 1987, for a 
sophisticated analysis of the relationship of origins and functions in social behavior). 
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the so-called “psychological” design features emphasized by recent authors. 
This issue is of such importance that numerous books and entire issues of 
journals have been devoted to it. I think misunderstandings about the on- 
togeny of behavior in relation to its selective background underlie a major 
part of the hostility toward approaches to human behavior from the discipline 
of biology. Moreover, it has recently become obvious that even the most 
sophisticated investigators in the field disagree about proper applications of 
the concept of evolved adaptiveness to human activities and the relationship 
of genes to behavioral expression, e.g., see later, Sherman (1987), Symons 
(1988), Dawkins (1982), and Betzig (1989).3 
ADAPTIVENESS AND ADAPTIVE DESIGN 
One difference between behaviorists and physiological and developmental 
biologists who examine proximate phenomena is their starting points. Be- 
haviorists begin with the need to postulate or model a particular sort of 
hypothetical physiological or ontogenetic underpinning, or background, for 
their behavioral findings; they tend to work backward from the behavioral 
expression itself, and are more likely to engage the question of ultimacy 
(reproductive significance) in their theorizing. So-called organismic (ac- 
tually, suborganismic) biologists more frequently begin with an observable 
physiological or other phenomenon before them, and they are usually in a 
3 A good example of the kind of misunderstanding and oversimplification that I refer to is the 
notion that one ought to expect that “a gene” should be locatable that would CCIUSP a particular 
behavior. I see this view as an extension of equally naive views about behavioral expressions 
being “heritable” if they are to be viewed as products of natural selection (see Appendix). 
Anyone who considers for a moment Dobzhansky’s (1961) admonition that “Heredity is par- 
ticulate but development is unitary” will understand that observed (and “selectable”) behaviors 
(behavioral differences) are not likely to be manufactured by single alleles. Individual genetic 
changes are more likely to lead to minor changes in potential ranges of behavioral expressions; 
and each of these will immediately be subject to (even rapid) changes as a result of additional 
genetic changes until the manner in which any or all previous individual genetic changes affected 
(affect!) the behavior become complex and obscured in the developmental pattern. This need 
not render the behavior immune to selection. Tierney (1986) makes this same point, as a neu- 
rophysiologist: “, specific genes do not control specific events in normal nervous system 
development. There are not one-to-one correspondences between genes and neural structures, 
but rather many-to-many relationships, with each developmental stage guided by epigenetic 
information (Jacobson, 1978). mutations that alter behavior are not in and of themselves 
‘compelling evidence’ that a given behavior is canalized, because the performance of learned 
behaviors can also be disrupted by mutations. all identified single-gene behavioral mutations 
are deleterious, they disrupt the development of the nervous system in complex and sometimes 
obscure fashions. There is no unequivocal evidence that single genes can program adaptive. 
canalized behavior.” (Also see Edelman. 1987 p. 342). This is precisely the condition that would 
be realized if my own statement (made independently) is correct. In considering all of Tierney’s 
arguments (especially those about learning being ancestral and innateness or “canalization” 
being derived), however, I think it is important to distinguish between neuronal variability that 
represents noise (imprecision in the face of epigenetic fluctuations from other sources) and 
flexibilities in neuronal behavior for which there is good reason to assume a history of selection 
(i.e., evolved adaptiveness). The usefulness of this distinction, particularly in attempting to 
understanding the behavior of neurones. emphasizes the importance to all biologists of engaging 
ultimate questions of functions. 
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position to carry out some analysis without being concerned with the ultimate 
function of particular neuromuscular or other kind of units available to them. 
This difference may be responsible for a (probably widespread) attitude ex- 
pressed to me by a prominent neurophysiologist who said, “For my work, 
evolution is just a frill.” 
Yet, the very term “mechanism” demands an understanding of v&on 
d’etre, and, as Cosmides and Tooby (1987, p. 285) point out, “It is nearly 
impossible to discover how a psychological mechanism processes infor- 
mation unless one knows what its function is, what it was ‘designed’ or 
selected to do” (see also, Rozin, 1976; Johnston, 1982a, b; Gould, 1986). 
Moreover, it is hardly debatable that organic evolution has been guided 
principally by natural selection, a process tending to preserve and elaborate 
traits of individuals that contribute eventually to their genetic reproduction 
(Williams, 1966; Dawkins, 1976, 1982,1987; Alexander, 1979, 1987; Maynard 
Smith, 1986). 
A serious problem faced by evolutionary psychologists seeking to elu- 
cidate and generalize underlying mechanisms of behavior, then, is that they 
must start in ignorance of the kinds of specific devices that organismic bi- 
ologists analyze, just as those biologists start in ignorance of the ultimate 
function of the devices they can observe more or less directly. Even when 
the most straightforward kind of behavior is being analyzed, it is often dif- 
ficult to develop statements about underlying mechanisms with sufficient 
specificity to be useful. Speaking of kin recognition mechanisms, Waldman 
et al. (1988) note that “At present, templates are more difficult to study than 
labels-indeed, as in studies of bird songs, they remain hypothetical con- 
structs, describing features that we assume must exist.” 
Williams (1966) wrote on this point as follows: “How, ultimately, does 
one ascertain the function of a biological mechanism? In this book 1 have 
assumed, as is customary, that functional design in something that can be 
intuitively comprehended by an investigator and convincingly communi- 
cated to others. Although this may often be true, I suspect that progress in 
teleonomy (the study of the functional organization of living systems, or of 
evolved adaptations) will soon demand a standardization of criteria for dem- 
onstrating adaptation, and a formal terminology for its description.” 
Investigators who claim that formal studies of design must figure prom- 
inently in every study of adaptiveness from the start rarely either develop 
or exemplify cases of adaptive design. Two exceptions are Cosmides (1989) 
and Barkow (1984), the latter giving two brief suggestions from the work of 
adaptively oriented investigators. Symons (1988), on the other hand, in a 
strong criticism of those who have sought to demonstrate the reproductive 
significance of human actions while advocating searches for underlying de- 
sign, fails to elucidate a single design mechanism, or even to expose precisely 
what he means by the concept. Following Hailman (1977), Borgerhoff 
Mulder (1987), and Betzig (1989), I suggest that the reason for this failure 
is that adaptive design cannot be studied except as part of (orfbllowing) a 
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study of a possible or demonstrated adaptive phenotypic outcome (by “dem- 
onstrated” adaptive outcome I mean a direct demonstration of reproductive 
significance, by “possible” I mean to refer to cases in which adaptiveness 
must be inferred, but in which there are reasons for doing so, as in the case 
of cricket communication discussed below). Examination of Symons’ (1989) 
examples (p. 141) reveals that a considerable knowledge of behavior and its 
probable and possible adaptive significance has preceded every one of his 
arguments for attention to mechanisms rather than behavior. 
Underlying adaptive design cannot be studied directly. One studies be- 
havioral and other outcomes, judges their reproductive significance-either 
by direct measurement or by inference (including inferences about the re- 
lationship of the current environment to those of the past: Alexander, 
1979)-and then infers the underlying physiological and morphological de- 
sign. Information about psychological and physiological mechanisms can be 
gained only by observing ultimate expressions of the phenotype-the varia- 
tions in performance that natural selection actually modifies (meaning those 
that actually affect reproduction)-in different circumstances. There is no 
other way. Underlying mechanisms of behavior are modified by selection 
only because of, and according to, their effects on behavior. 
If correct, the argument that behavior must be studied first means that 
the particular criticisms of such authors as Barkow (1984), Kitcher (1987a. 
b), and Symons (1987, 1989) that, for example, the initial approaches to 
analyses of female-biased infanticide in stratified human societies (Dicke- 
mann, 1979) and the avunculate, which examined their possible reproductive 
signiticance (Alexander, 1974, 1979; Kurland, 1979; Flinn, 1981) are wrong, 
are themselves wrong.4 
Sometimes it appears that some authors have simply failed to recognize 
efforts to analyze mechanisms, or perhaps that mere consideration of the 
reproductive significance of acts leads somehow automatically to the belief 
that underlying mechanisms are being neglected. This is not necessarily true, 
and it is unfortunate that the effort to draw attention to the important study 
of mechanisms is being promoted by the needless disparagement of efforts 
that are really complementary and essential to it. Such efforts often actually 
represent necessary and reasonable first steps in showing that evolutionary 
approaches to human cultural behavior are not necessarily impotent. This 
4 Kitcher (1987b) remarks (p. 91): “The main criticism that I level against Alexandrian socio- 
biology is that it introduces evolutionary considerations in the wrong way by focusing on be- 
havior and not on the underlying mechanisms . .” This statement is not only wrong on the 
basis that evolutionary considerations must be introduced by focusing first on behavior, but 
also because mechanisms are discussed for virtually every social behavior considered in any 
detail in Darwinism and Human Affairs, which Kitcher uses for his entire criticism of “Al- 
exandrian sociobiology” and to which the statement quoted above refers. (Thus, the book 
contains four chapters, with the second concerned almost entirely with the problem of proximate 
mechanisms: pp. 86-131 represent a single section concerned wholly with development and 
learning in adaptive behavior and include an extended discussion of the probable, possible, and 
unlikely mechanisms of kin recognition. For the avunculate, the discussion Kitcher seems to 
criticize most extensively, there is consideration of possible or probable mechanisms throughout 
its treatment, see. in particular, p. 174.) 
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was, for example, the stated intent of my initial exploration of the avunculate 
and the asymmetrical treatment of cross- and parallel-cousins (Alexander, 
1974, 1979, 1987~). Without such introductory studies, focusing on behavior 
and its adaptive possibilities, those who wish to examine the proximate 
mechanisms of behavior would have no program to pursue, and this will 
continue to be the case for every step in the analysis of adaptive mecha- 
nisms.’ 
A parallel can be drawn with Darwin’s (1859) discussion of sterile castes 
in social insects. He recognized that individuals who live their lives evidently 
designed not to produce offspring (their behavior is directed at collateral 
relatives and not at producing or assisting descendant relatives, and this 
behavioralfact is the central and driving puzzle identified by Darwin) rep- 
resented a challenge (he called the divergent phenotypic evolution of castes 
in these insects “the one special difficulty, which at first appears to me 
insuperable, and actually fatal to my whole theory”). The task of first im- 
portance, which he carried out, was to show that a plausible argument can 
be made explaining sterile castes by natural selection. He did not prove that 
his particular “just-so story” was the only one possible, or the correct one: 
William D. Hamilton developed that part of the argument 105 years later 
(as hypothesis rather than asserted conclusion, Darwin’s argument is better 
described as a “how-possibly explanation,” Dray, 1957; O’Hara, 1988). Nor 
did Darwin suggest underlying mechanisms or demonstrate the reproductive 
significance of helping in actual cases. He nevertheles started the process 
of science in regard to an evolutionary explanation of the “trait” of sterility, 
and as it turned out his logic actually did represent the correct (and complete) 
theoretical argument (Alexander, 1979; Alexander et al., 1990). 
To criticize those who initially call attention to adaptive possibilities in 
human behavior for not immediately elucidating the underlying physiological 
or psychological mechanisms (e.g., Kitcher, 1987a; Symons, 1988) is thus 
somewhat like criticizing Darwin for not discussing genes in his explanation 
of sterile castes. All scientific work is incomplete, and within science all 
’ It is crucial not to adopt the attitude that the study of possible mechanisms and the study of 
possible adaptive outcomes are somehow opposed (Alexander, 1987a; Sherman, 1987; Betzig. 
1989). For example, in remarking on a prediction from Alexander (1979) about primogeniture 
and its possible adaptive significance (p. 158), Kitcher (1987b) writes that “. The psycho- 
logical explanation I envisage would trace the distribution of parental resources among children 
to underlying concerns (such as the concern to maximize the welfare of children) and to features 
of the environment that determine how different courses of action are likely to affect the Mvlfare 
of the young.” Kitcher presents this description of possible mechanisms as a kind of demon- 
stration of how he would have proceeded, as a result of looking for the psychological mech- 
anisms involved, rather than the way I did. Nothing in his sentence, however, conflicts with 
the brief note from Alexander (1979) on primogeniture, nor adds to it, except that an evolutionary 
biologist, who would also envision such postulated mechanisms in parents, would see them as 
designed to serve the interests of the parents’ genes through offspring rather that simply max- 
imizing the welfare of children. By his own statement, Kitcher would have been required to 
understand the particular manner of distribution of parental resources, indeed, variations in it, 
first. The italicized part of his statement suggests that he has the same objections to interpre- 
tations of the reproductive significance of human behavior as Symons (1988), discussed later, 
in connection with polyandry, and by Alexander (1987a, c) in connection with female-biased 
infanticide in stratified societies. 
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hypothesis-testing leads only to additional hypotheses to be tested; whether 
it leads to ideological implications or social practice when it deals with hu- 
mans is another question entirely. The point is not to disparage those who 
have gone before and been imperfect or incomplete, but to identify what is 
wrong, if anything, replace it, and proceed with the analysis of mechanisms 
if that is what seems interesting and important, or with the description of 
additional adaptive possibilities in behavioral analysis if that is what seems 
interesting and important. 
I believe it is useful to point out these things because abundant reasons, 
compelling to many, seem always available for accepting uncritically ar- 
guments that evolutionary approaches to human behavior can be ignored, 
and it is all too easy to use needless and unnecessarily confusing attacks on 
others to promote one’s own approach. Progress in science does not require, 
or call for, efforts to use particular insufficiencies in method or interpretation 
of results to disparage, by some kind of pernicious extension, all efforts of 
the involved individuals, using phrases like “every rung of the sociobio- 
logical ladder is rotten” or labeling efforts such as <‘pop sociobiology” or 
“Darwinian anthropology” and then attempting to develop the impression 
that anyone so labeled for whatever reason does nothing useful. 
The question of design for (ultimately) reproduction is almost always 
difficult, and there are multiple ways to infer it. About a half century ago a 
prominent entomologist scoffed at the likelihood that the sound-making de- 
vices on cricket wings had anything to do with communication, and referred 
to them as analogous to the incidental creaking of the armor of knights of 
old. Biologists paid little attention to his argument, realizing that devices so 
elaborate have virtually no likelihood of having appeared incidentally or 
accidentally. In a similar way, one may infer that any human attribute that 
gives evidence of being highly evolved, or is too elaborate to be accidental, 
is likely to have had reproductive significance-to be adaptive in some con- 
text. The problem lies not in deciding whether or not complex evolved phe- 
nomena are adaptive but in identifying the context. The stridulatory struc- 
tures on the forewings of most crickets seem easy, because there are no 
obvious possibilities other than communication-even if communication 
was poorly, and in large part wrongly, understood at the time of the argument 
mentioned above (Otte, 1974). Williams (1966) used some examples that are 
almost as easy to understand: for example, he noted that if a fox, returning 
in deep snow after raiding a chickenhouse, uses his own tracks, we do not 
infer that fox feet were evolved to create paths in snow. Similarly, even if 
earthworms do nice things for garden soil, we do not infer that their digestive 
systems evolved to help us grow our crops. But we do infer that both fox 
feet and earthworm digestive tracts did indeed evolve, because they some- 
how advanced the reproduction of foxes and earthworms, respectively. 
I believe that the greatest barrier to general understanding of the po- 
tential contributions of biology to human self-understanding stem from naive 
views of ontogeny and phenotypic plasticity, of the relationships between 
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genes and ultimate phenotypic outcomes such as behavior. Such naivete is 
not restricted to those who have thought only briefly on such questions, or 
to nonbiologists: prominent evolutionary biologists often display it in its most 
unsupportable form. I have discussed such a case in connection with female- 
biased infanticide in stratified societies (Alexander, 1987~). Symons (1988) 
provides a parallel example, involving polyandry in human societies, which 
seems to me so important that it merits detailed discussion here. I quote 
Symons (p. 138): 
In DA [Darwinian Anthropology], however, the tendency to use reproduc- 
tive data to bypass rather than to illuminate the question of phenotypic 
design has led some scientists to describe as adaptations human activities 
that cannot possibly represent Darwinian adaptations. For example, con- 
sider Crook and Crook’s (1987) paper “Tibetan Polyandry: Problems of 
Adaptation and Fitness.” These authors write that “The central predictions 
made in a Darwinian perspective is that humans are endeavouring con- 
sciously or unconsciously to optimise their reproductive success. It is then 
a matter of research to discover whether individuals marrying in contrasting 
ways in different contexts are in fact showing behaviour that does promote 
their genetic fitness.” Their analysis of reproductive data on Tibetans who 
did and did not marry polyandrously leads Crook and Crook to conclude 
that polyandry is an adaptation to certain highly unusual environmental 
circumstances that some Tibetans have encountered in recent times. 
Crook and Crook’s analysis differs from behavioral ecologists’ superficially 
similar analyses of nonhuman animal polyandry for the following reason. 
An evolutionary behavioral ecologist who described facultative polyandry 
in a nonhuman animal species as an adaptation implies that heritable varia- 
tion in mating tendencies existed in ancestral populations of the species; 
that individuals in ancestral populations who mated polyandrously in spe- 
cific circumstances out-reproduced, on the average, those who did not; that 
the species possesses at least one physiological or psychological polyandry- 
promoting mechanism that owes its form to the above-average reproductive 
success of the facultatively polyandrous ancestors; in short, that the species 
possesses genes ji~fi)y polyandry. Crook and Crook’s description of the spe- 
cific environmental features to which Tibetan polyandry is supposed to be 
adapted clearly indicates that they are implying none of these things (also 
see Dawkins, 1982; p. 17-18). 
As I see it, Symons’ view of the relationship between genes and behavior 
omits most of what is important in understanding the adaptiveness of human 
behavior. To sustain his argument, one must believe either that the ability 
to learn is not an adaptation or that learning ability did not evolve because 
it could be (was being) applied to multiple or generalized life situations. I 
suggest, instead, that all of the implications Symons attributes to an evolu- 
tionary behavioral ecologist describing facultative polyandry in a nonhuman 
animal are likely correct for humans except the last one: that the species 
possesses “genes for polyandry, ” if one a) removes from the first implication 
the adjective “heritable” and substitutes “heritable variations in the ability 
to identify and mimic success (and to identify and avoid failure), or to make 
suitable cost-benefit decisions about different mating systems under different 
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environmental conditions,” and b) changes the third implication to read 
“owes its form in part . . . ” The effect of selection on this kind of heritable 
variation will be to produce an organism ever better at making the cost- 
benefit decisions that will cause it to strive for polyandry under the con- 
ditions that will cause polyandry to yield for it increased reproductive suc- 
cess compared to other mating systems. This effect will not yield “genes 
for polyandry.” It will, however, yield genes that increase the likelihood of 
polyandry under certain conditions. The adaptation is not genes for poly- 
andry, or even polyandry itself, but genes for cost-benefit decisions more 
effective in maximizing reproduction, in this case by engaging in polyandry 
when polyandry is reproductively profitable. The same argument applies to 
Symons’ earlier assertion that “cross cousin marriage per se is not a Dar- 
winian adaptation.” To my knowledge, no one has argued that it is; but the 
tendency to carry out cost-benefit decisions that lead to cross-cousin mar- 
riages under particular circumstances is indeed potentially a Darwinian ad- 
aptation, and there may be no other way to explain why people engage in 
cross-cousin marriages in the particular situations in which they do. All of 
the individuals whose work Symons derogates as “Darwinian anthropology” 
are associated closely enough with me that I can state unequivocally that 
they have always operated under the supposition that natural selection pro- 
duces conditional strategies, or behavioral flexibilities that enable (cause) 
individual humans to adopt particular behavioral alternatives when those 
alternatives are reproductively the most appropriate (as I have emphasized 
elsewhere, this statement necessarily specifies, as do all studies of adap- 
tiveness, “in the environments of history”). To deny that this particular 
form of flexibility represents evolutionary adaptation would leave us won- 
dering how behaviors appropriate to reproduction in this fashion do come 
about and erase any possibility of explaining the human species as a result 
of the evolutionary process. Symons’ citation of Dawkins (1982) as if it 
confirms his analysis is misleading, for Dawkins provides the kind of alter- 
native suggested here: “. . . or natural selection had to have favoured the 
universal occurrence of genes programming some complex ‘conditional 
strategy”’ (p. 28: also see Appendix). 
A simpler example may be helpful. During my childhood, my father, a 
farmer, adopted several practices that no one else in our community had 
ever used: contour planting, hill dropping of corn, grass waterways, planting 
of black locust trees for fencepost material on hilly, otherwise useless 
ground. These practices were viewed with great interest by our neighbors, 
an activity that I had already become aware was one of my father’s principal 
ways of deciding what to do next in his farming practices. When I encoun- 
tered the concept of culture in academia I realized immediately that a great 
deal of it is a matter of plagiarism. Apparently, my father was only different 
from his neighbors in that he paid more attention to what was being described 
in agricultural magazines and university circulars, and what was being done 
by farmers far distant from (as opposed to within) his own community. He 
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took those various innovations, churned them over in his mind, decided 
which ones were likely to work in his particular case, and chose among them 
on that basis. His neighbors were doing precisely the same things, using 
slightly different sources of information. Now no one would ever suppose 
that genes exist in human beings as a consequence of the history of natural 
selection that specifically contribute to whether or not grass waterways or 
contour farming will facilitate one’s reproductive success. There are no 
“genes for” grass waterways or contour farming. Nevertheless, I, and all 
of my associates in the use of evolutionary biology to understand human 
behavior, believe that it is appropriate to predict that the reasons for the 
particular manner in which my father used grass waterways involved the 
likelihood that his behavior would contribute, in the end, to his reproductive 
success. In other words, we study human behavior as if we expected that 
innovations of this sort, given a special kind of risk when they are truly 
innovations, are likely to increase on average the genetic reproduction of 
those who undertake them (here, the risk is exemplified by the fact, for 
example, that it was unknown that scourges of locust-boring beetles would, 
a decade or so later, make the fourth practice listed above an acknowledged 
failure). We obviously think that this is a legitimate prediction, and that kind 
of thinking is the basis on which we examine such things as adopting par- 
ticular cultural practices as being related to the adaptive history of human 
beings. 
What Symons has done, ironically, is to misconstrue the appropriate 
underlying design, while insisting, even more ironically, that the authors he 
was criticizing were themselves using reproductive data to “bypass rather 
than illuminate” the mechanisms he himself could not envision, although he 
also purports to be the first to seek such mechanisms in an appropriate 
fashion. Using Dawkins’ (1982) terms, in the model described above, alleles 
would indeed have been replaced by other alleles, across generations. The 
difference between the arguments of Symons and those of others such as, 
presumably, Crook and Crook, and certainly myself, is merely in what kinds 
of alleles have been involved in these replacements, in terms of the particular 
kinds of effects they have had on the phenotype; the alleles I and at least 
those “Darwinian anthropologists” in my vicinity have envisioned in this 
context have never been other than alleles improving abilities to make re- 
productively appropriate decisions. What I see as the insufficiency in the 
view adopted by Symons affects every effort to apply Darwinian theory to 
the understanding of human behavior and its underlying adaptive design. It 
necessarily leads its proponents into an almost complete blind alley in any 
effort to explain the human behavioral repertoire. Small wonder at the in- 
sistence on emphasizing something else, in the form of underlying mecha- 
nisms. It is worth repeating that Symons (1988) describes not a single phys- 
iological or psychological mechanism underlying any adaptive performance 
by humans, and his insistence that it is not necessary to identify neurophy- 
siological structures to study such mechanisms in humans (as opposed, he 
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says, to grasshoppers!) causes even the identity of such mechanisms to be- 
come mysterious. The question is particularly apt in view of Symons’ con- 
clusion (p. 143) that “design is usually manifested at the psychological rather 
than the behavioral level.” This assertion, I believe, is precisely backward: 
adaptive design is always manifested at the behavioral (or other ultimate 
phenotypic) level, even if verification or explanation requires (or benefits 
from) exploration of other epigenetic features, such as underlying psycho- 
logical, physiological, morphological, and developmental phenomena. If 
adaptive design is manifested at something called the “psychological” level, 
then we may legitimately expect that in his rather severe and far-reaching 
criticism Symons might have brought forth at least one example from the 
existing body of knowledge about human behavior and psychology. More- 
over, we would also expect that the principal students, or recognizers, of 
evolutionary adaptation would be physiologists rather than behaviorists; this 
is notoriously not the case. 
It is possible to imagine several different ways that genes might give rise 
to particular expressions of the phenotype (also see Johnston, 1982b, and 
below). First, genes might cause some phenotypes to produce only a single 
outcome no matter what (“normal”) range of environments the individual 
encounters. This might happen at a particular age or stage of development. 
Thus, all humans have hearts, even if their hearts vary (that somewhere 
along the way hearts became essential to life is necessarily secondary to the 
fact that normally developing individuals always have them). Second, genes 
might cause organisms to produce one or another of two or more different 
phenotypes, depending on some aspect of the environment. Thus, plant or 
animals raised under long days develop one phenotype (e.g., respectively, 
flowering; long-winged, flying) and the same forms raised under short days 
develop another (e.g., respectively, vegetative; short-winged, non-flying). 
In each case the phenotype is appropriate to the season represented by day 
length for that species. Third, and most important for understanding human 
behavior, genes may create phenotypes capable of changing their behavior 
progressively, or along a more or less continuous axis of variation, as a 
result of such things as repetition, practice, observation of others, playing 
out mental scenarios that yield probable outcomes, or accepting the out- 
comes of mental scenarios of others, transmitted by language. 
Flinn and Alexander (1982) postulate two simple and general mecha- 
nisms by which adaptation in cultural matters might proceed: abilities to 
imitate success and to anti-imitate failure. Both abilities quite obviously exist 
and are employed more or less continually by humans; they exemplify the 
“nongenetic” aspect of what Boyd and Richerson (1982; 1985) have referred 
to as the “d&l inheritance” system of culture. We learn from both the 
successes and the errors of others, and from building scenarios within our 
minds by which we can predict outcomes without actually experiencing 
them. Indeed, because of language, we are also able-uniquely among all 
organisms, perhaps-to learn extensively by making judgments about the 
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intellectual scenarios of others. As a result, humans have come to engage 
very extensively in what I have elsewhere called surrogate scenario-building 
(Alexander, 1987a, b; 1989): that is, primarily through language, we para- 
sitize the mental scenarios of others or hire them to build scenarios for us. 
Humans imitate success and anti-imitate failure in efforts to seek power 
through wealth and rank assiduously enough to leave the strong implication 
that the tendencies are evolved, hence reproductive. Sex bias in infanticide 
in stratified societies, for example (Dickemann, 1979), is so closely tied to 
wealth, power, and rank that to me it seems almost ridiculous to doubt that, 
as imitation of success and anti-imitation of failure, it is connected to a 
history of adaptive behavior. No one can doubt that unravelling the hierarchy 
of mechanisms right back from these psychological ones into physiological 
and morphological ones, and finding out how things have changed across 
the centuries, will be interesting and important. But nothing in this suggestion 
disparages the hypotheses developed by evolutionary biologists examining 
the reproductive significance of human behavior, that is, through study of 
the behavior itself as adaptive (Alexander, 1987~). The very nature of the 
mechanisms just postulated obviates the necessity of thinking in terms of 
“genes for” behaviors such as female-biased infanticide among elites in 
stratified societies: the mechanisms utilized are much broader and more 
flexible, and their operation (and evolution) easier to comprehend. 
The above two mechanisms imply that humans have evolved special 
abilities to judge success and failure, and they cause us to ask in what terms 
these two outcomes are judged. The apparent answer is, in terms of their 
effects on wealth, power, and rank. It would appear that, in general, positive 
effects on wealth, power, and rank have, throughout most of human history, 
had positive effects on reproduction by providing, ultimately, greater access 
to superior mates and other resources of reproduction (Alexander, 1987~; 
Betzig, 1988; Turke, 1989).6 
A major benefit of the arguments of the various authors cited above is 
that they focus our attention on three important questions. 
What are the actual sources of the perhaps rather widespread uneasiness about 
efforts to examine the reproductive significance of human behavior? On this 
first question I argue three separate points. First, the inexactness and inef- 
ficiency that Symons (and others) would like to pinpoint typically stem, not 
from naive attribution of genes for particular behaviors or failure to focus 
on underlying design mechanisms, but rather from failures to identify and 
test all alternative hypotheses (in other words, from sometimes omitting or 
misunderstanding what may be the most likely hypotheses; for examples 
see Alexander, 1987~). Second, I think there is a failure to understand what 
’ One might say that if we are not programmed directly, or in any general fashion, to maximize 
inclusive fitness (that is, only via hierarchies of domain-specific mechanisms). one of those 
“narrow” mechanisms may nevertheless be that we are programmed to “win” socially, and 
to use the same general judgments, with respect to winning, in a variety of social situations. 
Adaptive Study of Learning and Development 255 
is being tested and what procedure is being followed. Symons, for example, 
lists several Darwinian predictions about human societies by different in- 
vestigators and then argues that, if the predictions had not been met, no 
general propositions about natural selection would thereby have been fal- 
sified or even called into question. Of course not. As Williams (1987) has 
pointed out, if one’s pickup truck does not start he does not assume that 
the laws of physics are flawed. To find that a strong Darwinian prediction 
is not met does, however, provide a case that immediately assumes impor- 
tance, even if its importance ultimately lies solely in uncovering the special 
and perhaps hidden or non-intuitive reasons for the failure of prediction. 
Such cases are the stuff of modern evolutionary biology, whether the sub- 
jects are human or otherwise. They provide the keys by which the extraor- 
dinarily complex and diverse results of natural selection, in humans as well 
as nonhumans, are ferreted out and comprehended. Moreover, if failures to 
meet Darwinian predictions continued to accumulate, and were inexplain- 
able in Darwinian terms through closer examination, then general propo- 
sitions about natural selection would indeed be called into question. The 
third aspect of this first point is that humans clearly are not aware that their 
everyday activities might be directed toward reproduction (leaving aside for 
the moment the question of out-of-context responses to novelty). When con- 
fronted with the possibility they typically regard it as ludicrous or with hos- 
tility. It appears that these mechanisms work through causing humans to 
strive for more proximate outcomes that themselves lead reliably to in- 
creases in reproductive success, compared to alternative actions. Examples 
are efforts to attain wealth, power, and status. It is even true that humans 
often deny interest in these goals, evidently in part (at least) because of 
conscious and unconscious understanding of the social value of such denials. 
Unraveling the adaptive psychological or physiological mechanisms that mo- 
tivate human behavior is not something removed from these revelations but 
an inextricable aspect of them. The truly intriguing question about underlying 
design mechanisms such as those involved in cost-benefit decisions about 
variously novel activities is how these mechanisms typically appear to lead 
to behavior that enhances reproductive success. It is difficult to imagine that 
humans could evolve if this had not been true throughout our history. The 
kinds of studies conducted by Betzig (1988), and Turke and Betzig (1983, 
and disparaged by Symons (1988), are necessary to see if everyday cost- 
benefit decisions do indeed lead to improved reproduction. 
The nature and effects of novelty in the environments of human behavior is 
the second important problem exposed in Symons’ (1987, 1988) critique. 
Symons argues that behavior (of humans in particular) does not yield evi- 
dence of its design for adaptive outcomes, and apparently believes that this 
is so because humans (confusingly more than other organisms?) now operate 
in environments different from those in which they evolved. Leaving aside 
the fact that any such condition will equally obscure evidence of design in 
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underlying mechanisms of behavior, intriguing questions are raised about 
the historical succession of environments of adaptation with respect to 
human behavioral expressions, in particular the relationship between the 
prevalence (and recurrence) of novelty in social interactions and its effect 
on the design of underlying (psychological, physiological, developmental) 
mechanisms of behavior (see below). 
The problem of identifying and specifying the nature of novelty in human 
environments is the third general question, which Cosmides and Tooby (1987, 
1988) explicitly seek to answer. The extent to which the kinds of learning 
and cost-benefit mechanisms postulated above and elsewhere are specific 
to particular contexts, that is, whether or not they can in some fashion 
represent generalizations.’ 
ADAPTIVENESS AND LEARNING THEORY 
Cosmides and Tooby (1987, 1988) believe that the classical view of learning, 
as a “domain-general” mechanism, or simply as behavior influenced by the 
environment, is too unfocused to be useful in exploring the specific back- 
grounds of adaptive behavior. They argue convincingly that what must un- 
derlie adaptive phenotypic outcomes, at least eventually, are mechanisms 
that are specific with respect to the “environmental domains” in relation to 
which they function. This argument, however important, is not new: Rozin 
(1976), for example, made it, starting with the more widely used phrase 
“general process view” (of learning: Seligman, 1970) (also see Lumsden and 
Wilson, 1981; Johnston, 1982a, b; J. L. Gould, 1986). I think that virtually 
every evolutionary biologist or evolution-minded social scientist already ad- 
heres to some such position, and, moreover, would also expect the existence 
of a hierarchy of such mechanisms becoming increasingly specific with re- 
spect to environmental domains or targets, and how those domains or targets 
are deal with, as one works “backward” in development and experience 
toward the zygote itself, or the primary products of gene action. Rozin (1976) 
explicitly postulated such hierarchies among organisms in general. Such 
’ I believe that the developmental and functional dichotomies that typify nearly all discussions 
of human activities, not only in biology but in the human-oriented sciences, philosophy, and 
the humanities, are inadequate, and responsible for much unnecessary misunderstanding and 
acrimony. Thus, culture is not analogous to icing on a cake, a behavioral veneer on a phenotype 
that is seen as somehow prior to cultural effects. There is no “biogram” that is analogous to 
a cake prior to icing, or to some amorphous half-developed phenotype ready for the cultural 
veneer. In development of the organism there is only one dichotomy worth sustaining: genes 
and environment (internal as well as external). When initial gene products are produced the 
environment has already begun its influence, and culture may even have already yielded effects. 
Moreover, humans are not unique in that multiple avenues of development (or learning) are 
possible depending on environment; rather, in this they are like essentially all forms of life 
(excepting, perhaps, some viruses that live parasitically). Cultural variations are special because 
of their complexity and diversity, and because of the particular way they can change cumu- 
latively through learning, but in no other respects (also see Appendix). 
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mechanisms, moreover, have been hypothesized in studies of song and other 
learning in birds (Konishi and Nottebohm, 1969), kin recognition in many 
kinds of animals (e.g., Holmes and Sherman, 1983; Waldman et al., 1988; 
and below), and virtually every case in which biologists are attempting to 
understand the physiological and developmental backgrounds of behavior 
in nonhuman organisms (Johnston, 1982a, b; J. L. Gould, 1982, 1986). 
One of the interesting sets of problems in considering such hierarchies 
(again, working backward in ontogeny) involves the distinction between 
learning and mechanisms so specific and so limited with respect to the out- 
comes they specify that we no longer refer to their operation as “learning.” 
What criteria are to be used to make this distinction, and to determine 
whether or not there are multiple levels in the hierarchy on one or both sides 
of the distinction between “learned” and “not learned” mechanisms or 
outcomes (see below)? Lumsden and Wilson (1981) divided “epigenetic 
rules” into “two classes that occur sequentially within the nervous system”: 
1) the “more automatic processes that lead from sensory filtering to per- 
ception” (i.e., constraints or guides attributable to known morphological or 
physiological phenomena), which they termed “primary” and 2) “the eval- 
uation of perception through the processes of memory, emotional response, 
and decision making through which individuals are predisposed to use certain 
culturgens in preference to others,” which they termed “secondary.” These 
authors, not cited by Cosmides and Tooby, undertake the most wide-ranging 
and ambitious review and discussion of human behavioral epigenesis in bi- 
ological terms to date. Their focus seems to be more on the nature of genetic 
underpinnings of behavior, and other phenotypic differences derive from 
genetic differences, rather than on the question of the adaptive significance 
of particular phenotypic outcomes (including both behavior and develop- 
mental and physiological mechanisms). In other words, Lumsden and Wilson 
were concerned with demonstrating the existence of genetic and develop- 
mental phenomena whose complexity would indicate adaptiveness in some 
context. 
Cosmides and Tooby (1987) also argue that the “domain-general” or 
“general-process” view of learning has resulted in the misapprehension that 
anything other than a tabula ram is evidence of a “constraint” on learning 
(Seligman and Hager, 1972; Hinde and Stevenson-Hinde, 1973, pp. 301-2), 
“The tendency to refer to . . . innate knowledge as ‘constraints on learning’ 
is perhaps the result of the mistaken notion that a tub&u rusu is possible, 
that learning is possible in the absence of a great deal of domain specific 
innate knowledge . . . that the human mind was ‘built down’ from a more 
general-purpose cognitive system present in our ancestors. Yet such a phy- 
logenetic history seems far from likely; it presumes that our primate ances- 
tors had a capacity to learn that was broader and more powerful than our 
own.” 
This general premise, which I accept (with reservations about the use 
of “innate,” e.g., see below and Alexander, 1979, pp. 279-280; 1987a, pp. 
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10-l I), was also argued extensively by Rozin (1976), Johnston (1982a, b), 
and J. L. Gould (1986) (also see Tierney, 1986). Nevertheless, constraints 
on a particular conception of learning, or on a process of generalizing learn- 
ing as an adaptive mechanism, can be imposed continually as learning 
evolves, without the actual situation ever approaching the conception. More- 
over, as Rozin (1976) suggested, developmental and evolutionary changes 
in learning sometimes may be appropriately seen as evolved constraints (see 
also Johnston, 1982a, b; J. L. Gould, 1986). For example, some songbird 
species “memorize” songs heard more or less throughout their lives; others 
do so a) only as juveniles in the nest before starting to sing themselves, b) 
then and also when starting to sing themselves, or c) primarily when starting 
to sing themselves (summarized by Slater, 1989). Some species learn their 
own species’ songs preferentially although subjected to the songs of other 
species, others develop repertoires including songs evidently learned from 
dozens of other species (e.g., Dowsett-Lemaire, 1979). Some species learn 
preferentially from individuals with which they associate, even if that is a 
member of another species; others do not (Baptista and Petrinovich, 1984; 
Kroodsma and Pickert, 1984; also see Slate, 1989; Alcock, 1989). Similarly, 
“imprinting” of the attributes of offspring (or parents) may occur only within 
a few minutes of hatching or birth. Such timing and context restrictions 
(constraints), often unusual enough to be set apart (e.g., as imprinting) from 
other kinds of learning by biologists, may virtually eliminate errors in natural 
situations; many forms also occur in humans. Such cases seem unlikely to 
represent incidental effects of pleiotropy or senescence and may often in- 
dicate evolved constraints on learning (cf. Rozin, 1976). Parallel examples 
could be gleaned from learning that carries special kinds of restrictions with 
respect to what patterns of information are allowed to influence subsequent 
behavior. Of course, evolution of constraints per se is especially likely to 
be a correct interpretation if narrow timing of learning, or other kinds of 
restrictions, are limited to a few species in a large group, and on other 
grounds as well, appear to be a phylogenetically derived condition. All ev- 
olutionary changes in learning that narrow its stimulus targets or eliminate 
errors occurring as a result of a too-general or too-broad focus (or as a result 
of novel chances for error following environmental change) may legitimately 
be seen as “constraints” on learning, as a subset of the general evolution 
of canalization of the phenotype. 
The basic message of Cosmides and Tooby (1987), and others who focus 
on the development of adaptive behavior, is that a general rule such as 
“maximize inclusive fitness” cannot be a useful guide for conducting life 
adaptively without a very large number of narrower, more explicit underlying 
rules that “frame” the individual problems encountered in day-to-day living. 
This view, which of course implies that kind of explicit guidance of devel- 
opment that a history of selection would yield, is also probably shared by 
virtually all evolutionarily-oriented scientists. The emphasis and new atten- 
tion supplied by Cosmides and Tooby, which would have been enhanced by 
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utilizing earlier writings taking the same approach, have undoubtedly had a 
positive and revitalizing effect on the topic. The question I would like to 
address eventually is: How does this argument and the studies of learning 
that underlie it, influence the effort to understand how components of the 
human psyche have evolved (Alexander, 1987a, 1989, in press)? 
A good description of the contrast between the two extreme views of 
learning is given by Gleitman (1984: 553), in relation to language learning: 
Many linguistic theories postulate not only a distinct mental representation 
or faculty of language (a ‘language organ,’ in Chomsky’s wording, func- 
tioning as autonomously as, say, the liver), but a highly modularized system 
internal to language itself . . . Proponents of such positions expect that 
language learning will be largely maturationally determined, that the mat- 
uration functions may be quite separate from those in other cognitive do- 
mains, and that different modules within the language systems may mature 
quasi-independently. In clear contrast, most developmental psycholinguists 
hold that language acquisition is best described by a global learning pro- 
cedure that is responsible for the acquisition of, e.g., knitting, arithmetic, 
and ancient history as well as, say, English . 
It is worth noting that Williams’ (1966) arguments for adaptiveness from 
“design” (by natural selection) do not negate either of these positions. On 
the other hand, as already noted, the “general purpose” model of learning 
raises acute questions about adaptiveness from design, with regard to the 
generality of mechanism and its relationship to environmental novelty. 
ADAPTIVENESS, LEARNING, AND NOVELTY 
Symons (1987, 1988) implies that human abilities arising from a general pur- 
pose effect of learning cannot be viewed appropriately in evolutionary adap- 
tive terms. Thereby, he incidentally raises the question whether there has 
been design by natural selection of learning systems prepared explicitly to 
deal with novel situations, even within a predicted range.8 
To deny that learning has evolved to deal with novelty seems to me to 
deny the possibility of the most distinctive psychical attributes of humans 
having evolved. (Robert Smuts, personal communication, has expressed the 
same thought this way, “. . . understanding how humans respond to novelty 
is what any true science of human behavior must be about.“) The issue is 
not trivial, as it bears upon the origins and reasons for acceptance and spread 
of learned social and cultural patterns of activity which are often, even typi- 
cally, novel. One might imagine that such phenomena indicate that modern 
human behavior simply cannot be connected to this history of natural se- 
lection that produced it, therefore, that there is no need for those who engage 
’ Novelty can be thought of as a) unprecedented events within a predicted range, or a range 
characteristic of the organism’s environments of evolution, or b) events outside the range of 
an organism’s evolutionary environment, even if within a predicted range. 
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in “textual analyses” of documents, language, artifacts, and other creations 
of human social life from the humanities and the social sciences to connect 
their analyses to the human history of natural selection. I propose, instead 
(also see Alexander, 1987a, b; 1989), that c~n~ciou~ne~~ is a vehicle (mech- 
anism) of a kind of “general purpose” learning, evolved explicitly (designed 
by natural selection) to prepare us for a flow of novel social circumstances, 
at least in the sense of tuning us and motivating us with respect to a myriad 
of cues and predictive contingencies in the actions of others and in the details 
of the contexts of those actions (which actions may often be novel in the 
above senses). I would also argue that, if, as many seem now to believe, 
the human psyche is evolved to deal with intraspecific social situations, as 
opposed to problems involving tools, predators, food-getting, and the phys- 
ical environment (Bigelow, 1969; Humphrey, 1976-1987; Alexander, 1987a, 
b, 1989, in press; Rose, 1980, 1983; Wynn, 1988), the environment of its 
operation has not changed so profoundly in the last several thousand years 
as many investigators seem to think.’ 
Contrary to depictions of prehistoric hominids as resembling dull, mo- 
ronic, and socially inept modern humans, and sometimes as being physically 
weak, vulnerable, and “half-evolved” as well, I suspect that our ancestors 
at every stage possessed greater agility and perhaps even more physical 
strength than modern humans, responsiveness to expressions and move- 
ments and quickness of visual notice to subtle evidences of changes of mood 
and intention in others that would be astonishing to us, and distinctive and 
complex social capabilities of a sort that would cause us to view them as 
different from ourselves rather than simply inferior or “not quite human.” 
I also expect that much of recent human psychical evolution has consisted 
of the elaboration of systems for complicating and concealing such changes 
of mood and intent, primarily by introducing deceptions of various sorts, 
and, in turn, for counteracting the continuing pattern of ever more subtle 
and sophisticated manipulations. 
Adaptiveness in the mechanisms of human behavior may be regarded 
by some as paralleling that involved in the structure and function of hands. 
Hands are useful in almost innumerable circumstances, some for which they 
’ Humphrey (1976) first explicitly and extensively developed the idea that the human psyche 
had evolved in a social context. He did not, however, give a reason why humans should have 
continued to live socially under conditions that would lead to strong selection for the brain and 
the psyche; nor did he appear to understand the necessity for such a reason. The arguments 
of Darwin (1859, 1871), Keith (1949), and others, expanded and developed primarily by Bigelow 
(1969), Alexander and Tinkle (1968), Carneiro (1970), and Alexander (1971, 1974, 1979, 1987a, 
b, 1989. in press), suggesting that humans have long lived in competitive and aggressive social 
groups as part of a within-species balance-of-power race, not only provide the context that 
Humphrey omitted but, as perhaps all of these authors understood, require the outcome that 
Humphrey independently postulated, that the selective forces molding the human brain and 
psyche are primarily social. Hamilton (1987) suggested that “In general it is the accuracy of 
forecasts in incremingly untried siruarions increasingly disfant in time. that is the measure of 
the possession of intelligence.” He did not cite or discuss the arguments of previous authors. 
however, nor did he distinguish social and other (nonhuman) forces such as predator and prey 
strategies and navigational problems. 
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were designed and some not (i.e., some of their uses have in the past resulted 
in the saving of changes leading to their present-makeup and others have 
not). Some present uses of hands were designed for them, such as type- 
writers, telephones, and “hand” tools. The question about learning or con- 
sciousness that parallels the design of hands is whether or not hands were 
designed to deal with novel situations (e.g., any situation within some range 
of contexts). My view is that they were not, but that they are now so used 
because some aspects of learning and consciousness have been so designed. 
We identify adaptiveness as an outcome of the effect of repeated events 
upon the genetic materials. Repeated events are by definition not novel. 
Even though the circumstances encountered by each individual organism 
during its lifetime may be novel, as a set, nevertheless, the organism’s de- 
velopmental and other responses are seen as adaptive only if (the assumption 
is because) their appearance hinges on aspects of the individually unique 
environment of the individual organism having been present repeatedly in 
the environments of the organism’s ancestors. The question generated here 
is: Can an organism be prepared by natural selection explicitly (i.e., not 
merely incidentally) to deal with novel social circumstances? We already 
know that such preparation has occurred in other contexts, for example, the 
immune system, in which antigens never before encountered by the organism 
or its ancestors may be controlled by the production of antibodies more or 
less specifically binding the antigens, the presence of which stimulates their 
production (Edelman, 1973, 1987). Edelman (1987) argues that the nervous 
system develops, in general, in a way commensurate with the notion of being 
prepared to deal with novelty; “One of the fundamental tasks of the nervous 
system is to carry on adaptive perceptual categorization of an ‘unlabeled’ 
world-one in which the macroscopic order and arrangement of objects and 
events (and even their definition or discrimination) cannot be prefigured for 
an organism . . .” (p. 7) and “. . . selection upon degenerate repertoires of 
reentrantly connected neuronal groups . . . can result in effective catego- 
rization without a preexisting explicit program describing the objects to be 
categorized” (p. 8). Both the immune system, and the nervous system, as 
Edelman sees it, are also “. . . consistent with the selectionist notion that 
there is no general-purpose animal -only the adaptive evolution of particular 
sensory sheets and adaptive motor ensembles and of the somatic principle 
itself evinced by particular mechanisms within the phenotype.” (p. 19). This 
view is consistent with the notion of learning mechanism as special-purpose 
phenomena without precluding the notion that social learning can take the 
form of a special (or general) purpose mechanism evolved to deal with social 
novelty. 
Consider the ability of humans to construct scenarios and visualize their 
outcomes, and to use this activity to respond appropriately to novel com- 
binations of social circumstances. We can easily imagine that the background 
of such ability is that those possessing increasingly elaborate and effective 
forms of it throughout human history outcompeted their fellows in the scram- 
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ble for the resources of reproduction. It is difficult to understand scenario- 
building except as based on individual experience, whether direct or only 
as a result of tuning in on the scenarios of others. In this sense it is not an 
activity based on novelties, and this is a sense perhaps comparable to the 
sense in which the unique environment of each developing organism is never- 
theless not unique in historical terms. An organism’s lifetime environment, 
after all, has the possibilityof being unique in the sense that it is a unique 
combination of events, none of which is individually unique in the phylo- 
genetic history of the organism. The social lives of individual humans un- 
doubtedly include innumerable unique events, and in some ways the extent 
and nature of this uniqueness is reinforcing so that it magnifies across gen- 
erations, for example, as a result of cultural change. Unique social events 
can be crucial to the success of individual humans. Are humans only inci- 
dentally prepared to cope with such novelty, or were they somehow selected 
explicitly to deal with at least some aspects of it?” 
Suppose that the most significant barriers to reproduction, repeatedly, 
over long periods, are limitations on the organism’s ability to deal with events 
that have never been encountered during phylogenetic history. Such a sce- 
nario can scarcely be long applicable without the introduction of novelty at 
an ever-increasing rate. In some sense this kind of change has characterized 
the social and cultural life of evolving humans (which Lumsden and Wilson, 
1981, aptly termed the only “eucultural” species). Abilities to utilize unique 
situations in the ontogeny of scenario-building capacities are one way of 
coping with such novelty. The question now seems to focus on what un- 
derlying ability might sharpen such capacities, and one thinks immediately 
of patterns of logic or any system that might provide assistance in deter- 
“i Novelty in social matters can take many forms and be variously profound; modern social 
situations, moreover, are not necessarily irrelevant. For example, consider my appearance in 
a courtroom some years ago to defend myself. I had never been in a courtroom before, this 
yielding sufficient novelty on so many fronts as to cause the judge to warn me that the courtroom 
is not a place to practice being a lawyer. I had never encountered the prosecutor before, so 
that not only his personality but the manner of his presentation and the evidence he would use 
could not be predicted entirely by me. I had met the state highway patrolman who testified 
only once late on a dark evening along the highway; and I had no knowledge which of the two 
patrolmen who had ticketed me would be testifying. The judge was new to me. I could not 
know what kind of argument the patrolman would use. I did not know that the prosecutor had 
been notified of my letter to the State Department of Justice complaining about the behavior 
of the patrolmen and was explicitly prepared to counter my arguments. All that served me were 
a) the resolve that come from my knowledge that I was innocent (and my desire to show my 
children. who also knew it, that, contrary to their belief, this fact could prevail) and b) the fact 
that I had spent almost the entire 24 hours preceding the trial constructing sequences of possible 
scenarios about the exchanges 1 would have with these people I had never met in this situation 
I had never before experienced. Nevertheless I won; and decisively, so that the judge stated 
at the end that he not only ruled me innocent, but declared as well his opinion that I could not 
have done what I had been accused of doing. To me it was astonishing to realize that 1 had 
scenario-ed my way through all but two of the situations that actually occurred in the courtroom 
beforehand, and that in those two cases 1 was able to anticipate (and change) the probable 
outcome by deliberating attempting to do so, while also deliberately slowing the procedure to 
allow myself time to imagine the next steps. Extensive novelty is typical of social situations, 
some of it more profound and some less profound. The argument 1 am making here is that we 
are evolved to strive as I did in this case, to deal with novelty on many fronts in social situations. 
and to “win” when conflicts of interest arise. as are our adversaries. 
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mining cause-effect relationships among social events of importance to the 
individual. The eventual question is whether any such system exists in hu- 
mans, and failure to identify such systems in some contexts may not deny 
the possibility of their presence in others. Thus, our inability to deal logically 
(or adaptively) with such environmental changes as an overabundance of 
inexpensive sugar, cigarettes, alcohol, or other pleasure-inducing or addic- 
tive drugs may not tell us anything at all about the absence of generalized 
learning systems that function in social life. It is also true that most con- 
siderations of the manners in which we deal with these kinds of novelities 
entirely omit their social significance; cigarettes may represent a net cost 
in their tendency to cause cancer, but until that issue had become an im- 
portant part of the way cigarette smoking is viewed by the public the overall 
effect of cigarette smoking could have been reproductively positive because 
of status or other social effects from being a smoker. 
Novelty in the environment can be dealt with by extracting from mem- 
ory fragments of relevant information from prior experiences that either 
parallel or represent parts of possible future episodes, and then combining 
these fragments so as to review and prepare for alternative novel future 
possibilities (that is what Hamilton, 1987, called “untried” situations). 
Whether or not selection favoring systems enabling us to respond ap- 
propriately to phylogenetically novel social situations has occurred, it would 
seem that some aspects of learning are in fact appropriately labeled as “do- 
main-general” or “general-purpose.” Thus, “classical conditioning” is a 
generalization that can be applied, in all likelihood, to every form of animal 
life. Moreover, it is useful in a bewilderingly wide array of adaptive (life) 
situations. In each of these life contexts, of course, conditioning may operate 
as a highly specialized mechanism designed for a particular behavioral out- 
come. ’ ’ 
I would expect that different generalizations about behavior changes 
appropriately labeled as “learning” could be arranged in a hierarchy of de- 
creasing degrees of universality, increasing likelihood of independent evo- 
lutionary origins (even if similar in form), and decreasing extents of use in 
different behavioral domains or life contexts. If this is true, it in no way 
detracts from the fact that any particular instance of learning in any particular 
species should be expected to be tuned and restricted to some particular 
adaptive use, and to be, in that sense, “domain-specific.” But many aspects 
of learning as a phenomenon, are, in the sense of being transferable between 
“programs,” also domain-general. It is as if learning is a special case of 
changes of function during evolution, evolved in such a way as to be easily 
transferred between “programs,” and having a special likelihood of use- 
fulness in multiple life contexts. 
” In other words, the genetic and ontogenetic processes giving rise to the physiological mech- 
anisms underlying classical conditioning may be generalized, iterating some of their actions in 
the epigenetic production of conditioning mechanisms that operate in widely different life con- 
texts. Of course, “classical conditioning” can be defined or used suffkiently independently of 
physiology to render this hypothesis inapplicable (see Herrnstein, 1977). 
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An argument made with increasing frequency among those concerned 
with the adaptive significance of human behavior is that humans today live 
in environments quite unlike the early Plesistocene environment in which 
we supposedly evolved our most distinctively human attributes. It is some- 
times argued, from this beginning, that the novelty of our modern environ- 
ment precludes any study of behavior as adaptive because there are no 
“natural” contexts available for behavioral performance today. If, however, 
the human psyche has evolved as a device for dealing with social problems, 
then to a large extent this argument is impotent. Intraspecific social problems 
faced by modern humans almost certainly resemble, in general-and surely 
often in particular as well-those faced by humans ever since humans were 
passing through the transition from a prehuman state. I am suggesting that 
we are addicted to soap operas (and all other condensed and elaborate social 
dramas we call theatre) because our ancestors literally endured similar cir- 
cumstances in small groups of relatives and friends for thousands of gen- 
erations, in which nothing was more important than experience and skill in 
manipulating the people and events involved, and such experience and skill 
came from observation as well as actual participation in particular events. 
This proposition surely deserves investigation, in view of the increasing 
emphasis on social behavior as the prime selective force molding the human 
brain (e.g., Humphrey, 1976, 1987; Alexander, 1987a, 1989, in press). 
For two reasons, then, an evolutionary and adaptive approach to un- 
derstanding human behavior may have considerably more merit than many 
would grant: the social environment, which may be the primary force behind 
the evolution of the human psyche, 1) may not have changed as much as 
other aspects of the environment and 2) may have for a long time favored 
abilities to deal with certain kinds of environmental (especially social) nov- 
elty. 
LEARNING AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 
One way to start answering the questions posed above is to characterize 
extremes in the range of variation in the nature of the “Darwinian algo- 
rithms” that underly adaptive human behavior (also see Lumsden and Wil- 
son, 1981; Johnston, 1982b). This range, I expect, will incidentally encom- 
pass the range that occurs in the phenotypic repertoires of all nonhuman 
organisms as well. 
Consider, at one extreme, the following example (from Alexander, 
1987a:257; see also, Lumsden and Wilson, 1981, pp. 83 ff.); 
“Organisms that live in environments containing deadly snakes evolve 
to acquire avoidance responses to the snakes before they are ever encoun- 
tered. As individuals they do not rely upon trial and error learning to react 
to the danger of the snake’s strike; if they did they would be dead. Because 
we usually do not know how such preprogrammed responses appear in in- 
Adaptive Study of Learning and Development 265 
dividuals, or even the context of their development, they. are commonly 
given the convenient (but [developmentally] uninformative) label of ‘in- 
nate.’ ” When this term is used, it appears typically to be intended to imply 
that no learning was involved. 
Avoidance of snakes by humans is a case in which the “domain-spe- 
cific” nature of the mechanism penetrates into the observed and “thought- 
about” behavior; it directly involves the actual phenotypic outcome-the 
adaptive result. Yet the most we can say about the underlying mechanism 
is that, whatever it may be, it apparently prepares us behaviorally before 
the event in which the behavior is useful arises. Even if, as Cosmides and 
Tooby (1987) assert, “innate” is not an alternative to “learned,” it is still 
true that learned, when applied to any particular behavior, is a positive term 
meaning that we know something about the ontogenetic or experiential back- 
ground of the behavior.” Innate, on the other hand, is a negative term, 
essentially stating that we know nothing of the background of a behavior 
except that it is somehow cryptic and does not seem to involve the obvious 
changes in response that would have enabled or caused us to regard it as 
learned. I3 
Fodor (1983) distinguishes “innate” (as an alternative to “some sort of 
learning process”) and “hard-wired” (as “associated with specific, local- 
ized, and elaborate structural neural systems” and an alternative to “im- 
plemented” by “relatively equipotential neural systems”). Johnston (1982b) 
suggests two “adaptively equivalent” ways that invariant outcomes might 
eventuate during ontogeny: 1) by “strict genetic control over development, 
so that the outcome is insensitive to [variations in] the conditions under 
which it occurs” (innate) and 2) by “. . . a developmental sensitivity only 
to environmental factors that are themselves invariant within the animal’s 
developmental niche” (pre- or hard-wired?) (pp.419-420). One difference 
between the two, he argues, is that in the second case “Outside the [de- 
velopmental] niche, this system either produces non-adaptive phenotypic 
outcomes or fails to develop.” Tierney (1986), Alcock (1989), and others 
emphasize that the distinction between the kinds of behavior indicated by 
these labels is not always clear. 
In attempting to describe the range of possible and probable mechanisms 
underlying behavior known to be learned, one might begin with the various 
kinds of learning and its presumed alternatives (see J. L. Gould, 1986): im- 
I2 This observation does not obviate the fact that the biases of some individuals may cause 
them prematurely to declare behaviors with unknown ontogenies to be “learned”; instead, it 
emphasizes that there is no way to identify “innate” behaviors that parallel the identification 
of behaviors as “learned” after conducting experiments which prove it. 
I3 “Hard-wired” or “pre-wired,” other terms often used for such postulated mechanisms, at 
least have a positive connotation, since they imply that some contingency other than the one 
which will yield the adaptive phenotype is responsible for the mechanism (or circuitry). From 
the point of view of practical interference with, say, behaviors deemed undesirable, as in either 
human criminal and other aggressive actions, and animal training, “innate” implies “un- 
changeable” or “irreversible,” while “hard-wired” at least implies that if we can discover the 
relevant contingency we can change the mechanism (wiring). 
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printing, classical conditioning, operant conditioning (trial and error), alpha 
conditioning (covert and overt) habituation, sensitization, and “higher order 
learning” (called “cognitive trial and error” by J. L. Gould, 1986). In dis- 
cussing constraints, limitations, or restrictions on learning, one could begin 
with restrictions of the senses to receive only relevant information (exclud- 
ing, including, magnifying, etc.), sensitive or critical periods, and selective 
learning, memory, or forgetting abilities. J. L. Gould (1986) uses a dozen or 
more terms that might be considered to represent models of mechanisms 
underlying learning: sign stimulus response, feature detectors, selective 
learning (learning and behavioral biases, spontaneous preferences), cogni- 
tive maps, neural “albums,” temporally defined memory arrays, recognition 
wiring, cue biases, default routines, etc. Similarly, Rozin (1976) speaks of 
inaccessible programs, different levels of accessibility, calibrational learn- 
ing, cognitive unconscious, and unconscious inference. One can add many 
ordinary concepts such as alteration of pleasure or rewards, or of avoidance 
of pain or punishment; acquiring abilities to imitate success or anti-imitate 
failure; acquisition of search images, and many others. All of these labels, 
which are not necessarily parallel or of equivalent ranks to one another, 
imply models for processes postulated to underlie particular behavioral 
expressions, and indicate that there has been considerable effort to elucidate 
the design of the mechanisms underlying behavior in adaptive contexts. 
One could actually continue to discuss the range of variation in “Dar- 
winian algorithms” applicable to human behavior using the same well-known 
example of responses to snakes. For it is also true that humans tend to 
respond negatively to the actual strikes of snakes (poisonous or not), that 
they pay attention to the interactions of others with snakes, that they respond 
to instruction and admonitions about snakes and their danger (and accounts 
of the interactions of others with snakes), that they seek out such instruction, 
and that they are keenly interested in the use of others’ scenarios about the 
danger (or lack of danger) from snakes. Moreover, humans also use the 
reactions of others to snakes to startle or frighten them, to create humor at 
their expense, and to show their own fearlessness or skill. In other words, 
humans use snakes, and human reactions to snakes, to elevate their own 
status and lower the status of others, and to manipulate others socially. One 
might say that, with snakes as the environmental medium, they use the 
consciousness, cognition, emotions, linguistic ability, and personality traits 
of themselves and others, all of the commonly listed aspects of the human 
psyche, to compete (both directly, and indirectly, via cooperation) by social 
manipulation. Using some of Rozin’s (1976) terms, the “pre-wired adaptive 
specialization” that causes us to behave appropriately (to inclusive fitness 
maximizing) is “accessible” to a variety of the conscious contexts in which 
we influence our inclusive fitness through social machinations. 
What is the nature of the mechanisms or “Darwinian algorithms” that 
might underlie the above uses of the psyche with respect to snakes? To 
explore them would relate efforts to explore the proximate mechanisms of 
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adaptive behavior in humans to efforts to consider the evolution of the psy- 
che. I have tried to provide insight into the nature of the psyche by playing 
information about its probable evolutionary background against information 
about its probable adaptive significance or current function (Alexander, 
1989). In this effort I have become especially interested in consciousness 
and scenario-building. Rozin (1976), Cosmides and Tooby (1987, 1988), Sy- 
mons (1987, 1989), Johnston (1982a,b), J. L. Gould (1986), Lumsden and 
Wilson (1981), and others are trying to do approximately the same thing, 
primarily by focusing on the nature of the underlying proximate mechanisms 
that lead to human behavioral outcomes in modern environments. The two 
efforts should be complementary. 
One unfortunate fact is obvious from the start: In any such efforts to 
analyze, we proceed as quickly out of the conscious-which, paradoxically, 
represents our system for analysis of itself-in one direction as in the other. 
If it seems abundantly clear to each of us that our behavior is not driven by 
a conscious realization of the value of inclusive fitness maximizing, and that 
this goal therefore does not in any motivational or deliberate sense drive 
our behavior, it is equally clear that we do not carry in our consciousness 
any comprehensive understanding, or perhaps even any glimpses, of the 
mechanisms and personal history that underlie our preparation for dealing 
with snakes, and as well typically none that tells us how we became vul- 
nerable to the manipulations of others in the context of snakes, or (at least 
sometimes) how to escape those manipulations. Nor can we locate or identify 
by “ordinary” accessing or consciousness (as opposed to accessing via the 
procedures of science) the mechanisms that inform us about sexual pref- 
erences, incest avoidance, kin recognition, or any number of other things 
that are centrally involved in our everyday social lives. In fact, the exten- 
siveness and complexity of the “cognitive unconscious” (Kihlstrom, 1987) 
and the evident superficiality and limited purview of consciousness, cause 
the evolution of consciousness (considered in light of adaptive consequences 
of behavior and “Darwinian algorithms”) to become an even more intriguing 
and difficult question. 
A misleading aspect of terms such as “hard-wired” and “innate” (as 
well as “genetically determined” and “instinctive”), when they are used to 
cover ignorance of developmental backgrounds of human behavior, is that 
they imply that the involved phenotypic outcome either was not learned in 
any fashion, or was not learned in the explicit context in which the eventual 
outcome functions; yet all that we really know in most cases, for humans, 
is that whatever led to that phenotypic outcome, it is not now conscious, 
may not have been conscious when it happened, and even may not be ac- 
cessible to the conscious at any time (indeed, absence of conscious memory 
is often sufficient in humans to cause a quick leap to the concept of “innate” 
or “pre-wired”). Even if there is the additional implication that, as with 
avoidance of inbreeding (or incest), there has to be a second more narrowly 
determined mechanism underlying the particular learning situation (and 
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mechanism) that can actually be demonstrated (that is, avoidance in sexual 
behavior of individuals associated with particular ways at particular devel- 
opment stages or times), we have known all along that there must be hier- 
archies of events and mechanisms underlying all phenotypic outcomes, with 
increasing restrictions on their domains of influence as one moves toward 
the zygote. 
In some sense, the problem is that we have not yet defined learning 
adequately, even in the most general sense. This is why we use vague terms 
such as “innate” and “pre-wired” to refer to behaviors that we wish to 
contrast with learning. It is probably also why concepts such as “bounda- 
ries” and “constraints” have arisen in connection with learning studies. In 
a sense, if we do not know what learning is not, we cannot specify what 
learning itself is. And, in turn, we cannot know what kinds of life situations 
can be expected to lead to the evolution of learning, as opposed to onto- 
genetic or developmental changes that are not appropriately so terms. The 
reason we have not defined learning properly, in my view, is that despite 
copious writings on the topic we have generally failed to investigate learning 
as a mechanism of evolutionary adaptation or reproductive success. 
Some years ago I lectured in an introductory honors psychology course 
on the phases of migratory locusts. I described the differences between the 
two extreme morphs-the migratory and statary phases-which differ pro- 
foundly in morphology, physiology, behavior, egg size, clutch size, etc. 
(Key, 1950; Kennedy, 1956). I noted that they are so different that they were 
originally described as different species. I described laboratory experiments 
showing that tendencies to change toward one or the other extreme had been 
brought about by visual, chemical, and tactual stimuli. To a biologist, fa- 
miliar with not only phases but the different castes of the eusocial insects, 
also brought about by environmental differences such as nutrition and pher- 
omones (Wilson, 1971), migratory and non-migratory phases excite interest 
but not disbelief. In the question-and-answer period, however, the under- 
graduate social science majors in this class began to express doubts that 
what I had just told them was truthful. I was so astonished at this reaction 
that I paused for a moment to stare at the class. During this brief interval 
the instructor called out from the back of the room, “It’s just another form 
of learning!” The class visibly subsided, at least now on the way to being 
convinced of something other than my lack of veracity or entomological 
expertise. I left the class wondering precisely what message had been con- 
veyed by the instructor’s words, and, not less, what he thought had been 
conveyed. 
Biologists probably do not often refer to the manner in which migratory 
locusts acquire the traits of one morph or another as “learning.” Indeed, I 
suspect that most of them would find this application of the word puzzling 
or uninformative. Why? Let’s take a slightly simpler case, mentioned earlier: 
day length is a “contingency” of season which indicates infallibly whether 
the next several weeks or months will be winter or summer-a growing 
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season or a diapausing season. Evidently for this reason, photoperiod is 
widely used by plants and animals to adjust to one of two different patterns 
of life activities. We do not typically call this kind of response “learned.” 
The reasons may be that the organism is prepared to accept photoperiod 
differences before they occur, and it has only one response to a given pho- 
toperiodic regime: if days are long, or becoming longer, the organism re- 
sponds in one way; if they are short, or becoming shorter. it responds in 
another. If the organism responds the wrong way it will die, just as with the 
initial response to a poisonous snake. It has no chance to correct the error. 
The mechanism is essentially the same as with locust phases and the “pre- 
wired” response to poisonous snakes, where there is also only one alter- 
native for each of two situations, in the latter case with and without a snake, 
respectively. This mechanism is not the same as those generally employed 
in social learning situations by humans. 
I suggest that the concept of learning applies to mechanisms that have 
evolved in life situations in which correctable adaptive errors occur, and 
that learning evolves when abilities by individuals to correct adaptive errors 
result in a net benej?t to them. This definition, and the resulting limitation, 
stipulates repetition of acts, with change occurring during or as a result of 
the repetitions. It explicitly excludes situations in which there is no possi- 
bility of error, or in which there is no chance to correct errors. Therefore, 
it excludes I) situations in which there is only a single satisfactory outcome, 
whether or not there are preceding contingencies on which to practice for 
its realization, and 2) situations in which there are multiple possible out- 
comes but no preceding contingencies on which to practice to achieve the 
most adaptive outcome, or none that can be used reliably to indicate which 
contingency will be the most adaptive one in a particular instance. Note that 
“preceding contingencies” here refers to contingencies within the lifetime 
of the individual; such contingencies do not exclude evoiutionavy novelty. 
Note also that repetitions and practice may, in humans at least, take place 
entirely in the mind (Alexander, in press). 
These restrictions on the concept of learning have immediate conse- 
quences for our interpretations of familiar situations. Thus, they raise ques- 
tions about why any animals (such as geese, ducks, chickens, and some 
birds) use a learning experience called “imprinting” to determine the ap- 
propriate species and sex toward which to direct mating behaviors as an 
adult. This question might have been raised anyway, because thousands 
(probably millions) of animal species do not involve any such experiences 
in the development of their sexual “preferences.” They acquire the ability 
and tendency to direct sexual activities toward appropriate partners without 
evidence of any kind of prior experience with members of their own species. 
Perhaps students of bird behavior did not raise this question because birds 
learn so many of their social and other responses in fairly obvious ways. 
Thus, ornithologists are acutely aware of the problem of how cowbirds and 
other parasitic birds sing appropriate songs or identify appropriate mates 
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(West and King, 1985), while entomologists rarely think about the question 
for insects, even though most insects have even less opportunity to learn 
about appropriate mates. 
It seems insufftcient to suggest that birds rely upon an appropriate learn- 
ing experience early in life to develop appropriately directed sexual behavior 
solely because the iearning experience is highly likely to be correct. Unlike 
the situation of an organism that uses day length to determine the appropriate 
life strategy, there not only is a chance for error (that presumably would 
not be present if the behavior were developed without the necessity of social 
experience), but there is no chance that two or more potentially successful 
alternatives exist that must be differentiated; the class of suitable mates 
includes only members of the other sex in the same species. We are led to 
the hypothesis that this learning experience has some other significance in 
which such alternatives do exist, and in which the particular social expe- 
rience that results in appropriate choice of class of mating partner plays a 
part. Perhaps birds that imprint in this fashion typically have inbreeding 
likelihoods that it is adaptive to overcome, or other kinds of mate choice 
problems that can be assisted by particular forms of learning involving im- 
printing. Such questions apparently have not been raised, and perhaps would 
not have been raised without the effort to think of appropriate limits on the 
concept of learning. Moreover, this way of looking at learning does not leave 
us with “no alternatives to learning” but “innate” and “hard-wired” or 
“pre-wired.” Rather, it tends to lead us toward identifying different kinds 
of mechanisms alternative to the restricted definition of learning developed 
here. Perhaps most important, it stresses the adaptive significance of learning 
by describing the kind of environmental situation that is necessary and suf- 
ficient for its evolution. 
LEARNING AND MODELS OF KIN RECOGNITION 
Understanding kin recognition is the central “mechanisms” question in the 
adaptive (inclusive fitness maximizing) approach to social behavior. Con- 
trary to implications by recent authors that evolutionists have not been 
searching for “design” mechanisms, the topic is far from being neglected. 
As is shown in the following review, it illustrates superbly the interplay 
between knowledge of behavior and the search for underlying mechanisms. 
It also bears on the above effort to discuss learning in adaptive terms. 
Possible and probable mechanisms of kin recognition were outlined by 
Hamilton (1964) in the initial exposition of the concept of inclusive fitness. 
The subject has been pursued extensively and continuously on multiple 
fronts for more than adecade (Dawkins, 1976, 1982; Greenberg, 1979; Buckle 
and Greenberg, 1981; Crozier and Dix, 1979; Alexander and Borgia, 1978; 
Alexander, 1979; Wu et al, 1980; Holldobler and Michener, 1980; Getz, 1981, 
1982; Ridley and Grafen, 1981; Waldman, 1981, 1986; Beecher, 1982; Grau, 
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1982; Blaustein, 1983; Lacy and Sherman, 1983; Holmes and Sherman, 1982, 
1983; Breed, 1983; Holmes, 1984, 1988; Sherman and Holmes, 1985; Gam- 
boa, Reeve, and Pfennig, 1986; Fletcher and Michener, 1987; Waldman et 
al., 1988; Hepper, in press; and many more authors cited by these authors. 
Wilson (1987, p. 7) commented that “. . . rarely in the history of biology 
has a domain of empirical knowledge followed so closely and fruitfully upon 
an abstract theoretical idea.” 
Suppose that we apply the above restricted version of “learning” to 
the problem of understanding the mechanisms of kin recognition. First, it 
implies that the “break” between learned and other kinds of mechanisms 
for discriminating kin will occur between situations in which 1) different 
classes of kin are discriminated, or in which kin are discriminated from non- 
kin directly (i.e., when both are being encountered), and 2) every individual 
encountered is treated alike. Alexander (1979) referred to the second situ- 
ation as “nondiscriminative nepotism”.‘4 Two situations might be included. 
First, all individuals encountered may be treated with the same degree of 
beneficence, the correlate being that the species is divided into localized 
populations such that each individual typically encounters only close (maybe 
equally close) relatives (Alexander, 1979). Examples might be clones of 
aphids or sibling groups of caterpillars. Hamilton (1975) discussed this model 
under “viscous populations” (Table 1) (see also Crozier, 1987). 
Second, Holmes and Sherman (1983) noted that “When relatives are 
distributed predictably in space, nepotism may occur as a result of behavior 
specific to a given location . . . locations are recognized rather than con- 
specifics . . . and individuals’ behavior varies relative to some reference 
point such as a nest site.” Several examples of this situation are given from 
birds and treated under the label “spatial distribution.” In other words, all 
individuals encountered in a certain region (such as around the nest) are 
treated nondiscriminatively (Table 1). If this mechanism is the only one it 
requires no danger of interlopers; if such jeopardy exists, then some addi- 
tional mechanism must be used to prevent mistakes (Lacy and Sherman, 
1983) and I would argue that it must be one of the learning mechanisms of 
discriminative nepotism described below. 
In nondiscriminative nepotism, there is no involvement of correctable 
errors in kin discrimination per se, only in learning the characteristics and 
limits of the appropriate localities in the second case. Chances for correct- 
able errors do occur, however, in all cases in which kin are actively (directly) 
discriminated from non-kin or in which multiple classes of kin are distin- 
guished, as in humans. In all cases in these two categories, one might hy- 
pothesize (Alexander, 1979) that kin are recognized a) by learning (and sub- 
sequently using) traits of individuals with whom an actor has had particular 
prior experiences (direct learning or environmentally mediated recognition) 
I4 Waldman et al. (1988) refer to this effect as “indirect kin recognition,” but this term seems 
to confuse this situation with learning of traits later used to give preferential treatment to strange 
individuals with the same traits. See Table 1). 
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Table 1. A Classification of Some Probable and Possible Situations and Mechanisms Involved 
in Certain Social Behaviors Requiring Preferential Treatment, such as Nepotism, 
Cooperation Between Parents, and Avoidance of Inbreeding 
Phenotypic traits of other individuals are not required (learned. remembered) 
I. Special behavior is nondiscriminative. displayed equally toward all associates. as might 
occur within separated, highly viscous populations such as groups of caterpillar siblings 
(Hamilton, 1964) 
2. Special behavior is site-specific. as in responses of various birds to putative young or 
mates at nest sites (Holmes and Sherman, 1982) 
3. Special behavior is situation-specific. as with initial response (as opposed to later, 
learned responses) of mammalian mothers to newborns (Alexander. 1979) 
4. Special behavior is a result of some combination of the above 
Phenotypic traits of other individuals are used (learned, remembered) 







Only in special localities (as within the nest in eusocial forms) 
Only in special situations (as when one learns a sibling by a parent’s behavior toward 
it) 
Only at special times (or ages, as with parents and offspring who either learn or reveal 
evidence of learning one another’s identity just before the possibility of error appears 
through possible mixing of different broods (e.g., Holmes and Sherman. 1982) 
Only if they are within a certain range of variation (e.g.. it may be more difficult to 
learn a specific response to an individual of another species, or to a conspecific individual 
of the “wrong” age or stage) 
Various combinations of the above 
Without restriction (hypothetical only) 
Truits are usrd (uftrr being lertrned) oni.v with respec~t to the uctuul individuuls from +tjhich 
they MVW leurned. (Note: this restriction is unlikely except when either learning is extremely 
precise or other potentially confusing individuals are not encountered in confusing situations: 
moreover, one expects learning to be extremely precise in the appropriate regards only when 
other potentially confusing individuals are regularly encountered) 
1. Only in special localities 
2. Only in special situations 
3. Only at special times 
4. Some combination of the above 
5. Without the above restrictions 
Truits ure used on individuals other than those from which they are leurned (rememhrred). 
(Note: This effect may be incidental as a result of faulty or incomplete learning or it may be 
an evolved adaptation. ‘The more likely individuals are to interact with previously unen- 
countered relatives in situations in which their phenotypes cannot be learned in any other 
fashion. the more likely this behavior, if it occurs, is evolved and thus adaptive: the less 
likely individuals are to encounter strange relatives the less likely they are to learn relatives 
preciselv enough to avoid this effect as an accidental or incidental effect) 
References are traits of prior social associates (different from those on which the memory 
is observed being used) 
a. Including environmental features such as site. situation, timing, plus traits of prior 
social associates 
b. Without requiring environmental features 
References are traits of self 
a. When association with a third party in a special situation creates an acceptance or 
rejection choice involving two rather different possibilities (as when, in humans, a 
man attempts to assess probability of paternity of a child “acceptance or rejection 
by comparing phenotypes,” Alexander, 1979) 
b. Without requiring third parties (“self-referential phenotype matching,” Holmes and 
Sherman. 1982) 
In a specific situation (e.g., only littermates) 
No specific situation (e.g., encountering strangers anywhere) 
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or b) by comparing phenotypes of novel individuals with those of other 
individuals with whom one has had different prior experiences and treating 
new individuals appropriately (indirect learning or socially mediated rec- 
ognition). Thus, for a), a female may treat as her own offspring any individual 
with which she has a particular experience associated with parturition or 
hatching; a juvenile may treat as its parent the first moving object of a certain 
size, shape, or color that it sees after hatching or birth (Table 1); a sweat 
bee may treat as a sibling any individual present in its nest before it leaves 
the nest itself; a human may treat as a sibling any individual toward whom 
its mother or father, or both, behave in a certain fashion; etc. For b), a sweat 
bee may treat as a nestmate an individual with traits resembling those of 
nestmates it encountered prior to becoming a guard bee (termed “mediated 
recognition” by Holmes and Sherman, 1982); humans may use mannerisms, 
habits, speech, surname, even (in the modern, evolutionarily novel world) 
possession of a book with a family tree just like one’s own, to help identify 
collateral relatives never before encountered. Humans may also use verbal 
cues or instruction from others. And they may use comparisons of their own 
traits with those of individuals with particular social associations with them- 
selves (such as a male comparing to himself an offspring of a woman with 
whom he knows he has had sexual relations as a test of whether or not it 
might be his own offspring); etc. (Alexander, 1979). All of these have been 
regarded as learning situations, and they all obviously meet the criterion of 
involving correctable errors (see Holmes and Sherman, 1983; Sherman and 
Holmes, 1985; Fletcher and Michener, 1987; Waldman et al., 1988; and Hep- 
per, in press, for reviews of cases of kin recognition). 
In the rest of this review I wish primarily to consider two issues: 1) the 
extent to which social learning, especially without self-reference, can ac- 
count for the kin recognition findings of different investigators with different 
organisms and 2) the differences between likely mechanisms in kin recog- 
nition involving beneficence and incest avoidance or other aspects of mate 
choice. 
Sweat bees as imperfect social learners. Sweat bee females have been shown 
in the laboratory to use the phenotypes of other females with which they 
associate as newly emerged adults to determine which familiar and strange 
females to allow into the nest when they are guarding the entrance (for the 
precise conditions, see Greenberg, 1979; Buckle and Greenberg, 1981). I 
suggest that some parts of these experiments, those in which relatives (or 
relatives of associates) never previously encountered are treated in a special 
way and similar experiments involving other organisms, most likely are dem- 
onstrating evolutionary mistakes, absent in the field and engendered by lab- 
oratory situations. In fact, it would appear that sweat bees recognize rela- 
tives almost precisely as humans do, according to the social mediated 
learning model advocated by Alexander (1979). The surprising part of the 
results (‘ ‘recognition” of relatives not previously encountered) may occur 
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because sweat bees in laboratory experiments make more mistakes than 
humans, and mistakes of a sort that humans rarely make. 
Any organism that learns who its relatives are, regardless of the means 
of learning, must remember their identity in order to treat them appropri- 
ately. This continued recognition is likely to be based on heritable variations 
in the traits used in recognition (Greenberg’s, 1979, “innate components” of 
kin recognition), whether the organisms are humans, sweat bees, honeybees, 
ants, ground squirrels, or any social species; non-heritable variations, which 
are also used, are also likely to be more tickle and temporary (e.g., Mintzer, 
1982; Linsenmair, 1987). Humans are so adept at remembering collections 
of traits that they almost invariably remember individuals (Wells, 1987), and 
almost surely have been strongly favored for doing so (and humans, in turn, 
have evidently been favored for being recognizable to other humans as in- 
dividuals). Some organisms that also learn heritable differences in traits, but 
are less capable, may not remember enough to recognize individuals but 
rather remember traits or sets of traits that are not unique. As a consequence 
they may mistakenly accept strangers with many attributes in common with 
their associates, especially in novel situations. No evidence seems yet to 
have been presented that sweat bees are required frequently in the field to 
judge whether or not to allow strange sisters or other strange close relatives 
into their nests, which has been the test situation in the laboratory that has 
attracted the most attention and that has, ironically, caused investigators to 
believe that these animals have unusual abilities to recognize kin. If female 
sweat bees tend to oviposit only in a single burrow system, wild sweat bees 
are unlikely to encounter strange siblings. Even if sisters sometimes nest in 
different burrows in the same region, so that guard bees might be approached 
at nest entrances by cousins, they are unlikely to be favored for allowing 
them in if the alternative is their nestmate sisters. 
According to the “imperfect social learning” hypothesis, the reason 
sweat bees are more likely to allow strange individuals into the nest that 
are more and more closely related to their nestmates (Buckle and Greenberg, 
1981, inbred the bees to different degrees to produce this result) is that they 
are less and less able to distinguish them from their nestmates because they 
have more and more traits in common, not that the guard bees are keener 
and keener about knowing who ought to be let into the nest on nepotistic 
grounds. 
Despite widespread acceptance, then, that 1) sweat bees are behaving 
in an unusual or unexpected fashion when they show tendencies to allow 
strange relatives of their nestmates into the nest or statements that 2) it is 
unknown whether humans or other vertebrates can accomplish the same 
feats (e.g., May and Robertson, 1980), humans and sweat bees probably use 
the same mechanism, the principal difference being that humans are so much 
more complex and accurate about it that they have failed to understand the 
“mistakes” of other species. 
Sources of reference in social learning about kinship. Holmes and Sherman 
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(1982, 1983; also see Lacy and Sherman, 1983; Holmes, 1988; Reeve, 1989) 
refer to sweat bees’ tendencies to treat unfamiliar kin of their prior associates 
as “phenotype matching” and regard this label as identical to Alexander’s 
(1979) “comparing phenotypes.” Holmes and Sherman, however, include 
in “phenotype matching” situations which are increasingly being considered 
separately (e.g., most chapters in Fletcher and Michener, 1987 and Figure 
1). They define phenotype matching as “an individual learns and recalls its 
relatives’ [read “associates”‘] phenotypes, or its own phenotype, and com- 
pares phenotypes of unfamiliar conspecifics to this learned ‘template”’ 
(Holmes and Sherman, 1982, p. 409). Sweat bees evidently do not use their 
own phenotypes in learning to recognize relatives, since individual bees that 
associate only with non-relatives later do not favor their relatives (Buckle 
and Greenberg, 1981). 
Lacy and Sherman (1983), in trying to relate phenotype matching to 
Alexander’s (1979) models, wrote (p. 506) that “As Alexander noted (1979, 
p. 116), the phenotype-matching mechansim ‘. . . does not require that the 
ability to recognize phenotypic attributes be conferred by the same genes 
causing the attributes, or that such abilities be used to make quantitative 
(as opposed to qualitative) judgments. Most importantly, it does not specify 
how the appropriate response to a particular phenotype is established: the 
judgment probably requires previous learning about one’s own phenotype 
(or those of others) as well as about the nature or significance of the particular 
relationship being accepted.’ ” In this statement, however, I was explicitly 
referring back to the circumstance in which (for example) a man asks whether 
the child of a particular woman, with whom he knows he has had sexual 
relations, is his or not (Table 1). This situation is not the same as, for ex- 
ample, an individual encountering a stranger, recognizing him as a stranger, 
and then asking himself whether or not the stranger is some particular kind 
of relative, or even recognizing two strangers as such and then asking 
whether one is a closer relative than the other. 
The two above situations represent opposite extremes. Anyone at- 
tempting to assess his relatedness to a stranger met outside any social context 
that might convey relevant information has nothing to use but his own phe- 
notype and, at least in cases such as sweat bees, his memory of other as- 
sociates (assuming he had had prior associations). The case involving pa- 
ternity assessment has additional special attributes. First, the man can know 
whether or not he had sexual relations with the mother at approximately the 
correct time (it isn’t necessary that he “know” this in the conscious human 
sense). Second, the child’s relationship to the man is one of two quite dif- 
ferent possibilities: an offspring or a non-relative. The man may also know 
the other likely sexual partners of the woman so that he can extend his 
comparisons to include their attributes. The man meeting strangers would 
have no specific categories of relatedness to decide between. 
Two kinds of situations used in experiments on kin recognition seem 
to fall between these two extremes. In the macaques studied by Wu et al. 
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(1980), a juvenile in the field presumably would never encounter juveniles 
that were not members of its own troop (the limit of the relevant social 
situation). Ajuvenile ground squirrel (e.g., Holmes and Sherman, 1982, 1983) 
still in the nest presumably would not encounter any juveniles that were not 
full- or half-siblings. Older female ground squirrels, being philopatric, are 
also likely to encounter close relatives repeatedly. The macaque, being a 
single birth, would not have littermates with which to compare to a stranger, 
but it might have associated with an older sibling with the same father. All 
mammals, of course, associate with their mothers, and some with their fa- 
thers as well. These kinds of details about social systems (behavior) are 
important to the investigators of the underlying design of kin recognition 
because they specify the avenues of learning available to the animals. 
Humans seem to have a tendency to attribute unusual or mysterious 
abilities in kin recognition to nonhuman species (e.g., May and Robertson, 
1980). One reason may be that the investigators belong to a different species 
and use different sensory means to distinguish associates (making the test 
animal’s behavior seem mysterious from the start). Another is that it is easy 
to interpret mistakes favoring socially strange relatives in test situations as 
evidence of unusually keen or complex kin recognition devices, rather than 
as evidence of imperfect learning or imperfect recognition devices; humans 
find it so easy to make distinctions that the animals are not making that they 
believe the animals are recognizing kin rather than failing to recognize prior 
associates. Failures to reject strange individuals with the attributes of prior 
associates can be favored by selection, but only if organisms regularly en- 
counter strangers toward whom nepotism (or some other relevant social 
behavior) can profitably be directed. Otherwise, there is no reason to believe 
there has been selection for abilities to transfer learning from one social 
situation to another. Incidental tendencies to treat novel relatives prefer- 
entially would be expected simply because there would have been no strong 
selection to refine ability to learn about and remember traits of actual as- 
sociates well enough to identify them as individuals and restrict preferential 
treatment to them. 
Full- and half-sibling recognition in ground squirrels. Consider the apparent 
ability to distinguish between full and half sisters by females of Belding’s 
ground squirrels (Sherman and Holmes, 1982; Holmes and Sherman, 1983; 
Sherman and Holmes, 1985) and related questions from laboratory results 
with cross-fostering (Holmes, 1986a, b; Sherman and Holmes, 1985). Holmes 
(1986a, b) and Sherman and Holmes (1985) attributed both sets of results to 
self-referential phenotype matching, meaning that the ground squirrels iden- 
tify strange relatives and distinguish full and half sisters by comparing other 
individuals with their own traits. Sherman and Holmes evidently drew this 
conclusion partly because they could not imagine how learning the traits of 
siblings could lead to the results they obtained, and partly because they 
believed their data actually supported the idea of self-referential phenotype 
Adaptive Study of Learning and Development 277 
matching: “Indeed, phenotype matching was proposed (Holmes and Sher- 
man, 1982, 1983) to account for kin recognition when cues based on rearing 
association were unavailable (e.g., paternal half siblings reared apart) or 
when rearing-association cues did not correlate accurately with relatedness 
(e.g., multiple insemination producing full and maternal half siblings that are 
reared together)” (Holmes, 1988, p. 405). Although Holmes’ statement uses 
the general term phenotype matching (Table I), it refers only to seff-refer- 
entiuf phenotype matching. 
It is probably believed generally that there is no way a social learning 
mechanism other than self-reference could explain the tendency of females 
of Belding’s ground squirrel to favor full sibling nestmates over half sibling 
nestmates (Holmes and Sherman, 1982, 1983): “The more obvious courses 
of social learning . . . knowing who the mother is, the family context, etc- 
will not serve here” (Hamilton, 1987, p. 421). I suggest, however, that im- 
perfect social learning has still not been eliminated in this case. 
If most multipy sired litters of ground squirrels are unevenly derived 
from the different fathers (as Hanken and Sherman, 1981, indicate, giving 
an average proportion of seven juveniles from one father to three from the 
other), then females in multiply sired litters will be subjected to a prepon- 
derance of attributes inherited from 1) the mother (all littermates) and 2) the 
male with more offspring. This means that if their individual recognition of 
sisters is imperfect, then because full sibling daughters of the more successful 
father are present in the greater proportion, an incidental effect will be that 
the traits of the majority father will on that basis be potentially more im- 
portant in remembering siblings who have been learned through association 
within the litter than will the traits of minority fathers. That is, traits of the 
majority father will be encountered more frequently or more continuously. 
Assuming either a gradual (cumulative) or a one-exposure learning process 
(even in the latter case the majority father’s traits are more likely to be 
encountered), an incidental consequence will then be a (probably weak) 
tendency to favor full sisters over half sisters. Several additional predictions 
follow from this hypothesis, some of which seem contrary to any other 
hypothesis: first, some females will be expected to treat their half sisters 
better than their full sisters, and females who do this are expected to be 
daughters of the less successful father of their litter. Second, interactions 
between half-sisters who are daughters of the majority and minority father, 
respectively, are expected to be asymmetrical: daughters of minority fathers 
are expected to treat their half sisters from the majority father better than 
vice versa. Third, if females do not use their own phenotypes (as here hy- 
pothesized), then in litters evenly divided between two or more fathers when 
the test animal has been excluded, females will not distinguish full and half 
sisters (actually, in laboratory cross-fostering experiments, presence of the 
mother, which can never be eliminated in experiments with ground squirrels, 
creates an asymmetry of unknown significance or degree in numbers of 
related individuals in the nest when juveniles are cross-fostered so as to 
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create symmetrical litters of natural and fostered offspring; it seems likely 
that the mother’s phenotype is important, yet how it compares with the 
phenotypes of littermates or self, especially in different circumstances, re- 
mains unknown, also see below). 
The interpretation suggested here accords with the results obtained by 
Sherman. Unfortunately, none of the three predictions of the imperfect social 
learning hypothesis can be tested from Sherman’s data, since he could not 
compare any individual female’s behavior toward her full- and half-sister 
littermates, respectively, but had to rely on mean rates of agonistic and 
cooperative interactions between selected full- and half-sister pairs. The only 
data that are even marginally relevant are Sherman’s (1980) comparisons of 
reciprocal territorial incursions by neighboring females. These results in- 
dicate that interactions between sibling nestmates (which would potentially 
include some cases like those described above in the third prediction) are 
slightly more asymmetrical (as the imperfect learning hypothesis would pre- 
dict) than either those between mothers and daughters or those between 
nonsibling non-nestmates. 
Holmes and Sherman (1983) note that “The data from our cross-fos- 
tering experiment in the field . . . are consistent with this [self-referential 
phenotype matching] hypothesis because as yearlings foster sisters were 
treated more like half sisters than full sisters.” Such a finding is also con- 
sistent with the hypothesis of imperfect social learning so long as cross- 
fostered individuals are in the minority or spend less time in the nest than 
natural offspring. Although Holmes and Sherman report neither numbers 
nor proportions of individuals cross-fostered per litter in the field, Sherman 
(personal communication) indicates that typically only a single individual 
was accepted into a nest. 
Self-referencing and recognition of paternal half siblings. Similarly, Holmes’ 
(1986b) discovery for Belding’s ground squirrel that strange paternal half 
siblings are distinguished from strange nonrelatives has been regarded as 
requiring self-reference. The tested ground squirrels were reared in litters 
of full siblings. Each female, then, was exposed to the attributes of her father 
throughout her nest life, and could well have favored strange paternal half 
siblings through imperfect social learning of the attribute of nestmates, with- 
out self reference being involved. In this respect, this result seems consistent 
with the hypothesis of use of father’s traits via nestmates in distinguishing 
full and half siblings. 
Influence of the mother. Holmes’ and Sherman’s results, both in the lab- 
oratory and in the field, suggest that prior social interactions as littermates 
cause female ground squirrels later to behave less aggressively and more 
cooperatively toward one another. However, as Holmes has pointed out to 
me (personal communication), the influence of the mother can never be 
eliminated. Thus, in the laboratory experiements, each female tested was 
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reared either with her own mother or with a strange mother. Even in the 
absence of influence from littermates or traits of self, a female reared with 
her own mother might see a strange sibling as a relative. The female with 
which she was tested, however, reared with a surrogate mother, would see 
her own sibling as having no familiar traits. 
Experiments with proportions of relatives in litters. Holmes (1986a) later con- 
ducted cross-fostering studies in which each female ground squirrel had dif- 
ferent numbers of own siblings and nonrelated individuals in its litter. Con- 
trary to predictions from the imperfect social learning hypothesis, he 
reported that proportions of siblings and nonsiblings in the litter with a tested 
female, even whether or not a tested female was the only member of her 
natal litter in a particular social litter, did not affect her tendency to behave 
agonistically toward a sibling or a nonsibling reared in another litter. His 
results were virtually identical for all of the different proportions of siblings 
and nonsiblings used. These results caused Holmes to argue that self-ref- 
erential phenotype matching which he believed had already been demon- 
strated in Sherman’s field results with full and half siblings and his own 
study of pig-tailed macaques (Wu et al., 1980), was the only possible ex- 
planation. These results of Holmes may seem surprising, because they sug- 
gest that amounts of time spent in the presence of siblings’ traits, numbers 
of times exposed to such traits, numbers of individuals asociated with that 
carry the traits, or likelihood of encountering a specific trait, all of which 
would vary with proportions of siblings, are all irrelevant to learning and 
remembering how to respond to relatives. 15,16 If either nestmates’ or moth- 
ers’ phenotypes were used, they would apparently need to be learned in a 
single experience, and not thereafter reinforced or altered. This would mean, 
however, that the first individual encountered during the necessary sensitive 
” Comparisons of figures 1 and 2 of Buckle and Greenberg (1981) suggest that proportions of 
two different kinds of nestmates probably did affect sweat bees’ acceptance of strange indi- 
viduals of the two kinds; thus, when bees were associated in groups of six comprising three 
sisters from each of two different families, each set of three sisters accepted into the nest 
unfamiliar sisters of their associates from the other family at rates of 67% and 64%, respectively; 
but when the association was five sisters of one family and one of the other, the five sisters 
accepted only 56% of sisters from the single individual’s family while the single individual 
accepted 73% of sisters from the family of her five associates. Also, sweat bees evidently do 
not use their own phenotypes in learning to recognize nestmates (Buckle and Greenberg, 1981). 
Unlike ground squirrels, sweat bees are reared without influence from their mothers, since the 
mothers only place an egg and larval food in a tunnel within the nest burrow and then close 
that tunnel. 
” In the experiments reported by Holmes (1986a), female ground squirrels spent up to ap- 
proximately 72 hours with their littermates before being transferred. As Holmes notes, one may 
question whether this association is responsible for the lowered agonism between siblings reared 
in different litters as compared to nonsiblings reared in litters with one another’s sisters. Holmes 
(personal communication), however, reports that in examination of his unpublished data he 
found no correlation between variations in times less than 72 hours actually spent with litter- 
mates and degrees of agonism. It is possible that most learning takes place quickly enough that 
he did not have the appropriate range of variation in times of association. On the other hand, 
Sherman’s results with cross-fostered individuals in the field (Holmes and Sherman. 1982) sug- 
gest that tendencies to favor nestmates are not expressed in field situations until near the time 
of emergence from the nest, whether or not they are learned earlier. 
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period would be extraordinarily important, and in litters of different pro- 
portions of relatives of different sorts the prevalent kind of relative would 
more likely be the first encountered. As a result, the only way to account 
for Holmes’ results, as he has pointed out to me, is if matching with self 
were the only mechanism involved. It may seem unlikely that siblings’ or 
mothers’ traits, or both, are used in some situations and only self in others. 
Additional experiments are planned on these questions (Holmes, personal 
communication). 
Evidence of self-referencing in other organisms. It seem possible that self- 
referencing occurs as an incidental side effect of the evolution of capabilities 
to use the phenotypes of others in assessing relatedness. It might be sur- 
prising if such abilities did not exist, but it is important to conduct the kind 
of experiment that will distinguish between evolved and incidental effects. 
My view is that such abilities are unlikely to evolve in the context of nep- 
otism, not that they are unlikely to exist. On the other hand, unless effects 
of self-reference were neutral or beneficial, which I do not expect in the 
context of nepotism, one would expect tendencies to self-reference to be 
disfavored and thus to be learning-resistant, in the context of nepotism (but 
not in the context of mate choice, Alexander, 1979). 
Sherman and Holmes (1985) cite studies in which chickens were affected 
by their own phenotypes in later group and sexual interactions, but this 
happened only if 1) they were able to see themselves, as in a water dish 
(Salzen and Cornell, 1968) or 2) they were isolated for (up to 15) months 
(Vidal, 1982). Because single brief experiences can cause long-term imprint- 
ing in chicks, the conclusion we have to reach is that no bird or mammal 
has yet been shown to live naturally in a circumstances in which its own 
phenotype can possibly compete with those of its parents and/or siblings as 
a cue to grouping, and no unequivocal case of evidently evolved self-referent 
phenotype matching has been published. Alexander (1979) argued that the 
model of self-referencing without third parties suffers the same problems as 
the green beard model (non-beneficent alleles that produce the help-eliciting 
phenotype and disagreement among the genes of the genome, also see Blau- 
stein, 1983). Queller (1985) argued that genes other than a green beard gene 
will gain from the action of a green beard gene because they are slightly 
more than randomly likely to be present in another genome with a green 
beard gene. The problem, though, is partly whether or not social learning 
situations exist that can set in place kin recognition mechanisms (e.g., social 
learning) that will enable non-green beard genes to outreproduce their al- 
ternates that must depend on green beard effects. To me that seems virtually 
inevitable. 
Self-matching, kin recognition, and mate choice. As a result of preceding 
discussions we can now think of two contrasting situations in which to con- 
sider the likelihood of self-referencing: 1) self-referential phenotype match- 
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ing when there is correlative information from variable social situations, 
when dramatically different classes of relatives are involved, and when the 
question is whether or not to dispense beneficence; and 2) self-referential 
phenotype matching when no information is available from variable social 
situations, relatedness changes according to slight gradations, and when the 
relevant question involves mate choice. After describing a system for dis- 
tinguishing classes of relatives through building up a knowledge of one’s 
own odors or visual appearance and that of relatives, Hamilton (1987, p. 
422) wrote on this topic as follows: 
. . . the proposed mechanism has no reason to stop at discriminating full- 
siblings from half-siblings. Among full-siblings, for example, there are those 
who happen to have a more similar shake out of chromosomes from the 
parents and those who have less. Rather surprisingly, there is already evi- 
dence that human discrimination (here undoubtedly using many media be- 
sides smell) can discriminate among full-siblings (Pakstis et al., 1972). so 
long as the genes involved in all parts of the discrimination are well spread 
among the chromosomes, all genes except for the ‘non-discriminator’ allele 
that is being replaced, benefit from any action that fulfills the kin-selection 
criterion on basis of the estimated r. We need not expect that other elements 
in the genome will evolve to suppress the effect. The system of measuring 
similarity is quite different from one that reacts to a particular trait-i.e., 
a ‘green-beard trait’ (Dawkins, 1976; Ridley and Grafen, 1981) as will shortly 
be seen. 
Hamilton’s reference at the end of the last sentence is to a following 
discussion comparing kin recognition to immune reactions, sexual recog- 
nition, and outbreeding signals. I argued (Alexander, 1979, pp. 118-l 19) that 
sexual recognition signals and immune reactions are unlike kin recognition 
signals (as a criterion of beneficence-giving) in that intragenomic conflict 
cannot be engendered because the interests of all genes in the genome are 
alike. Although different genes may carry conflicting information about 
which phenotype is the best potential mate for the genome in which they 
both reside (i.e., one or both may engender a response that is “wrong” and 
hurts them both reproductively), their interests will be equally served by 
selection of the best possible mate, regardless how this is accomplished. 
Their “disagreement” would be a consequence of one of them making a 
“mistake.” Contrarily, their interests will not always be equally served when 
the presence of either alone is used to select another individual as a target 
of beneficence, as in nepotism, because genes that can gain or lose through 
particular acts or nepotism recombine in different genotypes and gene effects 
can mimic traits so as to induce beneficience but never give it. Such “dis- 
agreement” is more likely to reflect an adaptive conflict of interest. This 
argument is the source of what Crozier (1987, p. 58) called “. . . the supposed 
greater complexity of recognition allele systems as against the phenotype 
matching systems (e.g., Alexander and Borgia, 1978) . . .” which he says 
“is more apparent than real.” Crozier notes that “the same locus may pos- 
sibly encode both for transmission of a behavioral signal and its reception,” 
and he cites Bentley and Hoy’s work on the mating system of interspecific 
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hybrids in Teleogryllus. It is a prediction of my argument that mating systems 
may be expected frequently to show such linkage but not systems of nep- 
otism. The results of Wu et al. (1980) with pig-tailed macaques may also be 
relevant not to nepotistic beneficence but to outbreeding. 
Despite the arguments of Ridley and Grafen (1981), and Hamilton’s 
tendency to view kin recognition and sexual recognition mechanisms as sim- 
ilar, I believe the above argument still holds. Moreover, I regard this point 
as so strong that if one discovers that members of a species are in fact able 
to distinguish closer and more distant relatives within a class, as suggested 
with full siblings among humans (Pakistis et al., 1972), this may be evidence 
that the ability is not an evolved mechanism of kin recognition, and probably 
is not used in that context (see above). The point that cannot be evaded in 
the “green-beard” problem is that there are more than two alternatives for 
the genes in a genome: one alternative is not to help anyone; another is to 
help anyone who carries any particular allele or set of alleles, regardless 
whether or not any other particular alleles are carried; and the third is to 
help only those who have some particular likelihood of carrying any gene 
in the genome, according to that likelihood. The third alternative obviously 
will work, when social beneficence is possible, and from the point of view 
of the genome as a whole, it is obviously better than the other two. The 
problem for kin recognition not dependent on social context, or solely through 
comparison with one’s own phenotype, is to prevent the second alternative 
from being deleted because it either leads to intragenomic conflict via trans- 
formation to a green beard effect or is a poorer alternative than not to help, 
or-should it arise in a sexual recognition or other context-to prevent it 
from being replaced by a social learning mechansim. The mathematics sug- 
gesting that every allele gains if it has a slightly greater than random prob- 
ability of being present in the genomes of both helped and helper individual 
(e.g., Queller, 1984) only work if one assumes that the involved alleles cannot 
be outcompeted by other alleles yielding greater benefits for themselves; if 
the evolution of kin helping is possible in the first place, then its tuning in 
the direction of increased benefit must also be possible-here via evolving 
toward a general and more or less even probability of presence of each allele 
in the helped individual. 
The function of tadpole kin recognition. The various so-called kin recognition 
results obtained with tadpoles (see references in Holmes and Sherman, 1983; 
Sherman and Holmes, 1985; Waldman et al., 1988) remain puzzling to me. 
These studies may represent a particularly good example for the basic ar- 
gument in this entire assay: that underlying mechanisms of behavior may 
not be understood, or even analyzed appropriately, until the probable se- 
lective value of the behavior they produce is known. The tadpole studies 
thus suggest a particular way of erring in studies of kin recognition, namely, 
believing that one is studying only kin recognition in the familiar context of 
how to be appropriately neopotistic, when in fact one is (either “instead” 
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of “also”) observing 1) “selfish herd” reactions (Hamilton, 1971) (efforts 
to stay in a group whether or not it is composed of relatives) and/or 2) mate 
selection precursors. Although both topics are regarded as parts of kin rec- 
ognition (most chapters in Fletcher and Michener, 1987, and especially Cro- 
zier, 1987), I have been arguing that the same mechanisms will not underlie 
them. The tadpole results may actually involve all of the three phenomena 
of kin recognition, selfish herd effects, and mate selection (the last perhaps 
including inbreeding and outbreeding effects). It is crucial to distinguish the 
three, if no objection can be raised to “genetic” (nonlearning) models for 
mate selection and if self-referencing is more likely in the last case (see 
Alexander, 1979, pp. 116-121). Indeed, the manner in which arthropods and 
the lower vertebrates (fish, amphibians, reptiles) identify members of their 
own species, and of the opposite sex, as appropriate mating partners is, I 
believe, 1) not known or suspected in any case to involve social learning, 
2) not demonstrated in any case to involve learning, and 3) utterly resistant 
to modification in the various insects where it has been studied most thor- 
oughly (e.g., crickets, see Alexander, 1969). The ability is probably wide- 
spread among insects to live alone for their entire lives yet mate preferen- 
tially or solely with members of their own species. Amphibians, too, 
probably select mating partners (in the sense of conspecifics of the other 
sex) by systems that are virtually excluded as possible mechanisms for dis- 
criminative kin recognition (Alexander, 1979, pp. 112-l 15). 
Many tadpole studies have measured how different individual tadpoles 
tend to remain close together in pans in the laboratory. The problem with 
the results is that we cannot easily predict what would be discovered with 
any species, or by comparing species, if not only discriminative kin rec- 
ognition but also one or more of the following is involved (to one degree or 
another): 1) selfish herd effects, 2) nondiscriminative nepotism, and 3) mate 
selection. For example, we don’t even know if a faint tendency to favor 
siblings when very young might be part of a system for rejecting mates that 
are members of other species much later in life, or a system of avoiding 
mating with close relatives, or even both. 
Regardless of reasons for doubting any of the mechanisms indicated in 
Table 1, they all involve learning, and all apparently involve the possibility 
of adaptive mistakes that can be corrected by experience or learning. The 
same is not true of indiscriminate nepotism or the so-called “genetic model.” 
The question is thus raised whether the hypotheses generated here about 
learning specify not only the situations in which learning is expected to 
evolve, but also situations in which non-learning mechanisms are not ex- 
pected by an (ardent) adaptationist to prevail. For non-learned mechanisms 
by which kin and non-kin are discriminated (as postulated, for example, via 
histocompatibility alleles: see Waldman et al., 1988) do not represent situ- 
ations in which correctable errors can be made. The question raised is this: 
If there are no learning situations preceding an association in which dis- 
crimination would be adaptive, then what is the likelihood that the animal 
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has evolved a mechanism that will allow it to determine whether or not the 
associate is kin (or possesses some particular allele in common) and behave 
appropriately? 
Obviously, I am not arguing that learning is not likely in selecting higher 
quality mates, at least in species in which there are certain kinds of repetitive 
interactions with prospective mates. But I am arguing that recognition of 
appropriate mates by class (conspecifics of the other sex) without learning 
is much more likely than kin recognition without learning. Hamilton has 
suggested (personal communication) that it is possible that a non-learned 
mate recognition or immune response mechanism can be used, at least tem- 
porarily, in the context of kin recognition (i.e., before the consequences of 
green beard effects deleterious to the rest of the genome can lead to its 
suppression). Nevertheless, such effects will be difficult to identify, because 
kin recognition can be employed not only in nepotism but in connection with 
adaptive outbreeding and inbreeding, where its consequences are more like 
those of mate recognition and immune reactions. (Interestingly, Yamazaki 
et al., 1988, have presented evidence from cross-fostering studies that, for 
inbred male mice previously shown to have “. . . a tendency to mate with 
females of an H-2 type different from their own. . . there is no cogent reason 
to invoke any agency . . . other than chemosensory imprinting.” This means, 
incidentally, that these animals are not, as might previously have been 
thought, using their own phenotypes to make comparisons with those of 
others.) Similarly, many of the results obtained with tadpoles that live in 
groups (see summary by Waldman et al., 1988; Waldman, 1988) may rep- 
resent evolved responses that simply keep tadpoles in their groups or enable 
them to return there (as parts of “selfish herd” responses, Hamilton, 1971). 
This may even be true for tests that show differences in responses to full 
and half siblings of various sorts, particularly since 1) in some species half 
siblings and unfamiliar siblings are not likely to be encountered in the field 
(Waldman et al., 1988) and 2) it is possible for results from mechanisms for 
staying in a group for selfish reasons, as with results with unfamiliar siblings 
or relatives of nestmates in sweat bees (above), to give deceptive effects 
suggesting the presence of adaptive kin discrimination in laboratory exper- 
iments. 
Honeybees. The above review is most deficient with regard to work on 
honeybee nestmate and kin recognition. Although the experiments are ex- 
tensive and complicated (Getz, 1981; Getz and Smith, 1983; Breed and Ben- 
nett, 1987; Getz, in press), none of this work unequivocally demonstrates 
use of self in a way that suggests evolved kin recognition or excludes im- 
perfect social learning. My primary reservations have to do, first with the 
same caveats Getz (in press) lists (p. 25) and, second, with the problem of 
who feeds larval bees that are later tested (as adults) for abilities to recognize 
kin in different situations. Unless it can be demonstrated that bees do not 
respond preferentially to the traits of their nurses, associative learning seems 
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to remain as a possible mechanism for discrimination of both full and half 
siblings and paternal half siblings in honeybees. In this regard, it is intriguing 
that worker bees in some experiments favor relatives (previously unen- 
countered as adults) in regard to food transfers but not in regard to agonistic 
interactions. Getz and Smith’s (1983) report that workers reared with only 
full sisters could then discriminate full and half sisters is consistent with an 
imperfect social learning hypothesis, as is the ancient apicultural practice 
of removing the old queen and substituting a new queen unrelated to the 
workers, by presenting her in a cage with a few of her own workers and an 
access hole plugged by candy that will take the resident workers a day or 
so to remove (also see Breed and Bennett, 1987). Even if nurse bees rep- 
resent both full and half siblings to juveniles, it seems necessary to determine 
who feeds whom, and eventually to discover the ultimate origins and modes 
of transmission of any biases. 
Conclusion. Kin recognition mechanisms obviously represent an extremely 
complex and involved set of proximate mechanisms of social behaviors. 
Regardless how the conflicts among current hypotheses are eventually re- 
solved, the extensive work being conducted with diverse species of social 
animals seems the paradigm example of how profitable investigation of adap- 
tive behavior and its underlying mechanisms can be conducted in concert. 
In setting out his theory of inclusive fitness, Hamilton (1964) provided bi- 
ologists with a set of intellectual challenges with respect to underlying de- 
sign-the adaptiveness of learning and development in the recognition and 
classification of other individuals-that has yielded a parallel to the last half 
century’s “Great Debate” of population genetics over the evolution of dom- 
inance and recessiveness in genes (e.g., Wallace, 1968). 
LEARNING, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE 
HUMAN PSYCHE 
Turning explicitly to questions about underlying mechanisms in the func- 
tioning of the human psyche (also see Alexander, 1989), I would propose 
that four of its aspects, cognition, linguistic ability, the emotions, and per- 
sonality traits, in general involve learning mechanisms that typically are not 
(and sometimes absolutely are not) available to our consciousness (the fifth 
aspect). This is so, I suggest, either, first because they involve primarily 
procedural knowledge (Kihlstrom, 1987), which, if conscious, would use 
expensive conscious time without contributing sufficiently to appropriate 
uses of knowledge, or second, because they involve knowledge used in de- 
ception or manipulation partly through the vehicle of self-deception (Trivers, 
1971, 1985; Alexander, 1979, 1987a, in press). Along with Humphrey (1983- 
1986), I see consciousness as a speciaf way of dealing with immediate social 
circumstances by being aware, and, moreover, as the system by which pro- 
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jections to future situations of a particularly useful sorr are accomplished 
(that is, via planning, foresight, scenario-building, etc.). Consciousness at 
least mimics the “general-purpose” or “domain-general” mechanisms that 
Cosmides and Tooby (1987) conclude are not important as broad explana- 
tions of the guiding forces underlying human behavior. I say “mimics” be- 
cause it is possible to argue that consciousness or its functional context (here 
argued to be social interaction) is itself, in some sense, a domain-specific 
context or activity. Consciousness continually refers us back to the (usually 
social) situation at hand, continually using current circumstances, coupled 
with others that we may recall from our memories, to deal with immediate 
and future situations. The social situations that seem tied to consciousness, 
and the manners in which we must deal with them if we are to serve our 
interests, change continually, before our eyes, so to speak, so that the strate- 
gies necessary to deal with them must also change continually. This is the 
aspect of sociality that conscious awareness seems especially equipped to 
manipulate. The nature of consciousness, moreover, seems to dictate that 
its manner of serving our social interests is general purpose or domain- 
general, in the sense of involving continual changes of strategy or tactics, 
depending on what our social competitors and cooperators are doing. 
Rozin (1976) argued for an “increased-accessibility” view of the evo- 
lution of intelligence, which, he suggested, contrasts with the “general-pro- 
cess” view. He saw the evolution of intelligence as in part a process of 
making “adaptive specializations ” “more accessible to other systems and, 
in the extreme . . . [conscious].” He also suggested that “part of the process 
of learning and education can be considered as bringing to consciousness 
some of the limited-access programs, the ‘cognitive unconscious,’ already 
in the head.” (p. 246) In some sense this “superficiality” of consciousness, 
or this “accessing” facility, is deceiving to us in regard to its seeming com- 
prehensiveness, in the manner of Jaynes (1977) lighted flashlight looking to 
see if every corner of the chamber it is in is dark. If we are not aware of 
(conscious of) the cognitive unconscious, we can scarcely be aware of its 
vastness and its complexity. 
Rozin’s view of consciousness seems to parallel the notion of “finder” 
or “directory” computer program, in which fragments of information from 
the cognitive unconscious are used as labels to retrieve packages of infor- 
mation needed to deal with the current situation. I wish my own argument 
to go beyond this view (which, however, seems to me appropriate and in- 
triguing as far as it goes). The view of consciousness and its use in scenario- 
building that I favor is one that uses a “tinder” kind of program to access 
information from, say, the cognitive unconscious, but then, perhaps more 
important (or more central to my concern), in turn uses the information so 
accessed in special ways, via scenario-building, to deal with social even- 
tualities (as, perhaps, in a “multi-finder” program which allows one to deal 
with material in several different programs at once, so as to construct novel 
combinations). 
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The “domain-specific” or “adaptive specialization” view of learning 
has led to criticism of conditioning experiments that utilize stimuli chosen 
without respect to the animal’s “developmental niche” (Johnston, 1982b). 
Thus, Johnston (1982b) remarks that “The use of arbitrary tasks to exclude 
instinctive abilities from experiments on learning implies that learning is to 
be treated as a general purpose ability, one that functions equally well in 
any environment that respects only a set of rather gross physiological and 
morphological constraints on the learner’s behavior . . . [however] if the 
general purpose nature of learning is not assumed, the use of arbitrary tasks 
becomes indefensible.” 
Rozin’s view, however, to which I am sympathetic, is slightly different: 
One could be led to conclude, as Schwartz (1974) has suggested, that ‘It is 
odd, but perhaps reaassuring, to think that by studying the behavior of 
pigeons in arbitrary situations, one learns nothing about the principles which 
govern the behavior of pigeons in nature, but a good deal about the prin- 
ciples which govern the behavior of people.’ The Skinner box presents a 
type of ‘abstract’ task in which ‘emancipated’ humans can perform well, 
since they can apply many programs over a wide variety of situations. 
Strangely enough, then, the adaptive specialization notion leads to a deli- 
nition of intelligence along the lines of concrete (limited, specific applica- 
bility) to abstract. This concrete-abstract dimension is reminiscent of what 
many psychologists mean by intelligence. 
One can also see that all interactions with other living forms, such as 
Cosmides and Tooby’s (1987) example of “when a tiger bounds toward you”, 
which, even if parallel, are infinitely simpler than those involving “when a 
conspecific social competitor tries to outwit you,” call for immediate do- 
main-specific underpinnings. Nor is there any reason to deny that there must 
be at least as complex a hierarchy of domain-specific mechanisms underlying 
consciousness as underlies any other aspect of behavior. It seems possible, 
however, that the particular nature of human consciousness, as I have been 
trying to describe it (including its misleading appearance of being central, 
deep, and comprehensive in our mental activities), is involved in the wide- 
spread belief in the importance of “domain-general” or “general process” 
kinds of learning and strategizing. 
Consciousness, then, may be a system not only for accessing and reac- 
cessing certain kinds of information that we are going to use primarily in 
social circumstances, but for developing their use. This argument requires 
that some of the contexts in which humans use consciousness now be unable 
to account for its evolution. Examples are learning to type or play a musical 
instrument, or to decide which tool is appropriate or how to make some 
particular tool. Tool use may appear to be the principal competitor for the 
argument that only social interactions can account for the evolution and 
maintenance of human scenario-building (Humphrey, 1976, 1986; Alexander, 
1979, 1989). One question, however, is whether or not tool manufacture and 
use were generated to solve food or social problems (Wynn, 1988). Another 
is whether scenario-building (foresight, planning ability) evolved in connec- 
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tion with tool use, or evolved in some other context, and then was expressed 
or used in connection with tools. 
J. L. Gould (1986) uses the term “cognitive trial-and-error” for a kind 
of planning or purpose, or “higher-order learning,” for “neural constructs 
by which animals in some sense ‘think’ about the problem, evaluating be- 
havioral alternatives or formulating a ‘plan’ of sorts . . .” He regards cog- 
nitive trial and error as widespread in nonhuman organisms and not restricted 
to social interactions. He believes that it “would not seem to require con- 
sciousness, though awareness might on the one hand facilitate it, or, on the 
other, create behavior which, though as automatic as egg-rolling or stinging, 
might easily be mistaken for consciousness.” 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND SOCIAL RECIPROCITY 
A central value of my arguments, if they are at least partly correct, should 
be in explicating the elaboration and maintenance of social reciprocity (re- 
ciprocal altruism: Trivers, 1972), defined (here) as successive reciprocal 
contributions to (or investments in) one another’s inclusive fitness, with 
resulting temporary losses in own inclusive fitness, by two (or more) sociul 
interactants, in which all participants ultimately gain in fitness relative to 
nonparticipants. Social reciprocity thus is expected to evolve only when 
each contributor’s investment is repaid with interest. Social reciprocity may 
be extensive and elaborate only in the social interactions of humans, where 
it is certainly more extensive and elaborate than in any other species. It is 
demonstrated only with great difficulty in nonhuman species, and, as Connor 
(1986) has noted, is typically confused there with mutualism and pseudo- 
reciprocity (the latter being social investment with a net temporary cost 
followed by a return with interest to the original investor as a consequence 
of “selfish” or non-investing behavior on the part of the original beneficiary). 
I believe that social reciprocity is unlikely in the absence of conscious 
purpose, planning, or scenario-building of the sort that we know humans 
engage in more or less continually, particularly in connection with social 
interactions. 
Authors like Shepard (1984), when describing the usefulness of mental 
processes like dreaming and scenario-building in solving problems, typically 
list only outcomes relating to tool use (lowering a golf score by imagining 
a new grip, mentally devising a new one-handed method of tying sutures in 
an abdominal operation, etc.) or some kind of cognitive mapping, again 
raising the question whether such uses might not be the context of evolution 
of the scenario-building capacities of humans. I don’t believe so (Rose, 1980, 
1983; Wynn, 1988). By far the most difficult, uncertain (but with this quality 
amenable to alleviation through immediately prior contingencies), and mul- 
tiple-option events involving potentially extreme costs and benefits to hu- 
mans are social interactions (Humphrey, 1976-1987; Alexander, 1979-1989). 
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All other kinds of hostile forces in nature have been dealt with by nonhuman 
organisms, probably repeatedly, using something other than the human kind 
of consciousness. The actions of other humans are the most severe tests of 
our abilities to look ahead and be prepared for any contingency. Moreover, 
social conquests or accomplishments are not as likely to be paraded (re- 
membered, emphasized, broadcast) as examples such as tool use because 
of the way humans view evidence of motivations in others to “win” socially 
and to use their wins (through advertising them) to win again or further. 
Finally, what is unique about humans is not their use of tools (although 
their extensiveness and complexity of tool use is obviously unique), not their 
ability to map cognitively the physical environment (either geographically 
or temporally), and not merely social cooperation as such, whether in food 
securing or other similar contexts (e.g., Cosmides, 1985). Rather, it is the 
combination of social cooperation for the purpose of competing with other 
conspecijks, and the resulting extensiveness and complexity of social re- 
ciprocity. These aspects of human sociality, which, as a combination, may 
be shared only with chimpanzees, in turn, I see as evolving because of the 
unique significance of intergroup competition in human sociality and evo- 
lution, this feature in turn deriving from the combination of ecological dom- 
inance and complexly cooperative sociality in the human species (Alexander, 
1989, in press). Only this combination, moreover, can account for any degree 
of extremeness in both elaborateness and centrality of social reciprocity and 
the accompanying (and required) intellectual capabilities (that is, any extent 
of departure of humans from other species in these respects). 
Social reciprocity, as defined above, may be restricted to humans and 
a few similar primates (such as chimpanzees). The difficulty in even dis- 
cussing the possibility of its existence in nonhuman species, or of demon- 
strating it there, may derive in part from the necessity of describing it in 
terms of human abilities to build scenarios and examine options likely to be 
available in the future. Mistaken assertions or inadequate demonstrations 
of its supposed presence in nonhuman species often depend upon unjusti- 
fiably anthropomorphic accounts of behavior, probably because the exis- 
tence of social reciprocity depends upon human or human-like mental at- 
tributes that are both difficult to demonstrate and all too tempting (and easy) 
to invoke. 
J. L. Gould (1986) sees the ability of “cognitive trial and error,” which 
appears to be a simple form or parallel of scenario-building, as widespread 
among nonhuman species, but he also describes it as taking a form primarily 
useful in cognitive mapping of localities and tool use. As already noted, my 
arguments about consciousness imply that the extensiveness and complexity 
of tool use in humans, and conscious mapping of motor tasks outside social 
contexts, are capabilities that arose secondarily and incidentally as a con- 
sequence of the evolution of complex scenario-building in social contexts. 
These arguments beg the question of the likely precursor of the human 
kind of social reciprocity and scenario-building. This precursor might be 
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construed to be an environment and an organism characterized by many 
uses of pseudo-reciprocity, defined as situations in which one social partner 
is selfish throughout the interaction, never taking even a temporary net cost 
through social investment in the other (Connor, 1986). But pseudo-reci- 
procity does not necessarily call for long-term interactions, for complex and 
repeated weighing of investments, or even (always) for close attention to 
the other party and its investments by both interactants. Accordingly, I 
would rather argue for a background involving a long-lived, extensively ne- 
potistic species in which multiple relatives repeatedly invest in one another’s 
inclusive fitness (the payoff from nepotism coming from increases in the 
inclusive fitness of the recipient of nepotism rather than from return in- 
vestments in the nepotist). Such long-term patterns of alternating nepotistic 
investments virtually take the form of social reciprocity and can come to 
involve it, perhaps at first as a kind of “icing on the cake.” Moreover, this 
particular kind of nepotistic investing seems to me to require the same gen- 
eral kind of mental equipment as social reciprocity, therefore to prime for 
the evolution of social reciprocity in every way. It seems to me that an 
ancestor with this kind of behavior is also very likely for humans (and chim- 
panzees: see references and discussion in Alexander, 1989). 
Broad-scale accessing (to consciousness) of the sort suggested by Rozin 
(1976) may be what allows us to call up multiple strategies from multiple 
social contexts and use them appropriately. Adopting his scheme, we might 
suggest that special artistic, musical, linguistic, or other abilities might be 
special capabilities to “access” (to the general-purpose aspect of conscious- 
ness) certain relationships. Conversely, difficulties with the “languages” of 
mathematics or chemistry might represent special difficulties in accessing 
certain relationships. Some features of human activity, e.g., dyslexia and 
the extraordinarily rich abilities (but often quite narrow) of individuals 
known as particular kinds of “savants”, might be special forms of inacces- 
sibility that simply affect what seem to be more central or handicapping 
aspects of our lives in modern circumstances (cf. Velutino, 1987). 
The general view I am advocating here, especially the argument that 
consciousness evolved in social contexts, seems consistent with the idea of 
“procedural knowledge” being unconscious, and with at least some views 
of the conscious developed by those examining it in relation to cognition 
(e.g., Kihlstrom, 1987). (I speculate that this is why I am so negative toward 
most computers yet so positive toward the Macintosh, because the Mac- 
Intosh requires virtually no burdening of the conscious with learning and 
remembering of procedural knowledge.) It may become useful in extending 
the view that approaches to explaining the human psyche that depends on 
artificial intelligence and the computer analogy eventually fail because the 
computer lacks self-interest and the possibility of deception, self-deception, 
and social manipulation; hence, the computer lacks any analogue of con- 
sciousness. In effect, the computer is an extension of the cognitive uncon- 
scious of the human brain, and is so used by the conscious operations of 
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the brain, which perhaps continue to resist analysis precisely because of the 
manner in which it uses the cognitive unconscious. Rather than being pro- 
grammed utterly and completely around its own self-interests, the computer 
is programmed in a fashion paralleling that of our domestic animals. We 
select the psyches (and other features) of domestic animals continually so 
as to serve our interests in various ways, depending on the particular animal 
and its uses. We select them to serve their own interests only by serving 
ours, so that in effect they have no separate interests (Darwin said that we 
have selected dogs to return our kindnesses with interest). 
Computers start out with no interests of their own and are continually 
selected so as never to have any. Self-interest, and its consequences in 
respect to the psyche, are not merely a matter of complexity; they are a 
matter of organizational form, and of a dialectic between the nature of in- 
formation and its possible uses, always in terms of the costs and benefits to 
one party, the self. In my argument, moreover, self is always seen in relation 
to other conspecific parties (i.e., the function of consciousness is social). 
Thus, I see “self’ as consciously important because consciousness is 
a way of calculating how to serve self s interests explicitly when the obstacle 
to doing so is other selves with whom one must compete, sometimes by 
cooperating with still others. Self s interests can be advanced sometimes by 
adjusting how self is seen by others, through first observing the perception 
of self by other through self-consciousness (also see Alexander, 1989). Kihl- 
Strom (1987) states (pp. 1450, 1451): 
One thing is now clear: Consciousness is not to be identified with any par- 
ticular perceptual-cognitive functions such as discriminative response to 
stimulation, perception, memory, or the higher mental processes involved 
in judgment or problem-solving. All of these functions can take place outside 
of phenomenal awareness. Rather, consciousness is an experiential quality 
that may accompany any of these functions. The fact of conscious aware- 
ness may’ have particular consequences for psychological function-it 
seems necessary for voluntary control, for example, as well as for com- 
municating one’s mental states to others. But it is not necessary for complex 
psychological functioning , . for ongoing experience, thought, and action 
to become conscious, a link must be made between its mental representation 
and some mental representation of the self as agent or experiencer-as well, 
perhaps, as some representation of the environment in which these events 
take place. 
0 wad some Pow? the giftie gie us 
To see oursels as ithers see us! 
It wad frae mony a blunder free us, 
And foolish notion: 
What airs in dress an’ gait wad lea’e us, 
And e’en devotion! 
Robert Burns 
This essay was begun as a consequence of reading Cosmides and Tooby (1987), and following 
a lengthy and useful exchange with Donald Symons of the University of California, Santa 
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Barbara (begun orally in the spring of 1987, and continued in correspondence). It was aided by 
discussions in Biology 494, Human Behavior and Evolution, and a graduate student seminar 
or kin recognition, learning, and the nature and distribution of social reciprocity at The Uni- 
versity of Michigan. Gerald Borgia of the University of Maryland, Cynthia K. Sherman, and 
Paul W. Sherman of Cornell University, Randy Thornhill of the University of New Mexico, 
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby of Stanford University, Bernie Crespi of the University of 
New South Wales, Daniel Otte of the Philadelphia Academy of Natural Sciences, William Irons 
of Northwestern University, Napoleon Chagnon of the University of California Santa Barbara, 
and Laura Betzig, Paul Turke, David Buss, Robert Smuts, Beverly Strassmann, Richard C. 
Connor, and other members of the University of Michigan Evolution and Human Behavior 
Program also contributed to the thoughts expressed. Norman Kemp of the Department of Bi- 
ology of the University of Michigan helped with the background of the concept of epigenesis. 
Ann Heise and Aina Bernier of the Department of Biology, University of Michigan, deserve 
thanks for helping with both the ideas and the literature. I am especially grateful to Warren G. 
Holmes and Paul W. Sherman for reviewing the manuscript repeatedly, and for tolerating with 
patience and kindness my dense prose and my endless questions about their kin recognition 
results. Despite the critical nature of some of my comments they have always helped me freely 
and in good humor. As a result our joint efforts to understand how kin recognition really works 
became an enjoyable intellectual exercise. Finally, I am indebted to Harvey Wheeler and several 
anonymous referees who provoked me constructively. and thereby helped me immensely in 
clarifying my arguments. 
APPENDIX 
Heritability and Adaptiveness 
“To be an adaptation a trait has to be heritable.” 
What does this prevalent assertion mean? Is it sensible and correct, or 
confusing and irrelevant? 
First, the statement is a kind of shorthand that sometimes leads to mis- 
interpretation. Here is one way to expand it: “To represent a history of 
natural selection, differences in the expression of a trait must be owing to 
genetic differences.” 
By this expansion the assertion appears false. Consider environmentally 
modified traits of any kind: calluses, learning, body size, muscle or tendon 
volume and strength, chest capacity, etc. The variations themselves are not 
heritable: they are owing to differences in the environment of different or- 
ganisms or the same organism at different times. But the patterning of the 
variations certainly can cause them to be adaptive, indeed, it is almost certain 
to reveal this effect. Calluses appear in epithelial tissue that is stressed by 
wear or abrasion, and thereby protect it from further damage: learning is 
evidently patterned to enable organisms to correct errors, such as placing 
one’s hand in a fire or inadvertently entering the (subsequently identifiable) 
lair of a predator; muscles, tendons, and chest capacity change in response 
to increased exercise, precisely in the direction causing them to be better 
suited to the activities being pursued: body size increases when food is 
abundant, allowing reserves to be accumulated and leading to accomplish- 
ments of strength, dominance, or response to enemies unavailable to those 
of smaller body size. Reverse effects in most of these cases can in the same 
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way be seen to be at least potentially (and are eminently likely to be) adap- 
tive: thin epithelial tissue is presumably less expensive and also is more 
flexible and tactually more sensitive; excessive muscle or tendon develop- 
ment is also expensive, and at least sometimes interferes with speed and 
certain kinds of agility; small body size is advantageous when food is scarce; 
etc. Learning may seem the most difficult to understand in this light, but 
the ease with which we lose unused learning, the probability that one kind 
of learning may interfere with another, and the probability that capacities 
for learning and remembering are limited all suggest that even here both 
directions of environmentally induced variation are adaptive. 
For refutation of the original statement, of course, one needs only to 
demonstrate that environmentally induced phenotypic variations, that are 
legitimately termed variations in traits, can be adaptive, not that they are. 
In the case which prompted this essay, the author of the above statement 
was referring to such differences as 1) body size within and between species 
on a north-south axis, thus to whether or not an adaptive explanation such 
as Bergmann’s Rule could legitimately be invoked, and 2) jaw muscle volume 
differences in the same and different mammal species burrowing in different 
soil types. He might have wished to expand his statement differently, per- 
haps this way, “To be an adaptation, a trait must have a genetic basis.” 
But this statement is not helpful, since all traits have genetic bases: there 
is no way to produce any part of an organism except by the interaction of 
genes and environment. Accepting this expansion of the original statement 
would mean that one can essentially ignore the requirement of heritability 
because it is always met. Moreover, this expansion of the statement would 
actually suggest an error (a common one), which results from a confusion 
about the meaning of “heritable,” and is a frequent consequence of the 
genetic shorthand illustrated above. The genetic backgrounds of traits are 
examined, analyzed, and understood only via variations in the traits (even 
if molecular biology may someday change this). The genetic basis of a trait 
lacking in variations cannot even be identified. Accordingly, when anyone 
asks if a “trait” is heritable he doesn’t mean “Is it genetically based?” but 
“Are the variations in this trait owing to genetic variations?” Or, possibly: 
“Are the differences between this trait and other traits owing to genetic 
variations?” Even environmentally induced trait variations such as in cal- 
luses, learning, and all the others described above also “have a genetic 
basis.” That is, they are possible only because the organism possesses cer- 
tain sets of genes. In this case, indications of the existence and complexity 
of the genetic basis may be available to us from the patterning of the varia- 
tions in relation to environmental variations. For example, learning is prob- 
ably never a “blank slate” phenomenon: apparently all organisms tested 
learn some things better and faster than others. Even if different organisms 
did not differ in this regard or we were restricted to looking at one uniform 
population of a single species-for example, humans-we could compare the 
patterning of actual learning variations against a “blank slate” model and 
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from the comparison infer some things about the probable adaptiveness of 
learning (meaning both the underlying potential and its actual expressions, 
although everything we learned about the former would come from infor- 
mation about the latter). 
If one assumes that trait variations are at least potentially adaptive, then 
the most useful information about them to test the question of actual adap- 
tiveness is not their heritability but whether or not 1) the difference between 
two expressions of a trait is complex (implying not that the variations are 
owing to genetic variations but that the existence of the variations is owing 
to a substantial history of genetic change) and 2) each different expression 
of the trait appears to serve the well-being and (ultimately) reproduction of 
its particular bearer, in the particular environment in which it is (and, by 
inference, has been) living, better than any of the alternatives. 
The patterning of trait variations suggested in the second of these two 
questions implies that phenotypic plasticity is rarely just a matter of “slop” 
between gene action and ultimate phenotypic expression (therefore, a failure 
of adaptation). Although this “slop” view of phenotypic plasticity has been 
prevalent in some circles (for example, those who have steadfastly believed 
that if something is learned it cannot legitimately be related to a history of 
differential reproduction: perhaps such people are confused on this point 
because of the existence of traits that do not vary as a consequence of 
environmental fluctuations, at least in ways yet measurable), it carries in it 
a certain naivete about the concept of phenotype. Thus, there is no reason 
for phenotypes (organisms, traits) to have evolved-no reason for genes 
ever to make any product but another gene- except that they thereby create 
graded or alternative responses to graded or alternative environments. If 
environments did not vary in ways that genes could respond to adaptively 
by making phenotypes (which means “by being plastic”) there would be a 
continual tendency for life to revert to a condition of naked genes entirely 
lacking in phenotypes. 
If 1) either heritable or nonheritable differences are complex (for ex- 
ample, the differences between the stridulatory files or the song patterns of 
two different species of crickets), this complexity alone makes it parsimon- 
ious to assume that they are owing to a substantial history of genetic change, 
therefore that selection was involved (because selection is virtually inevi- 
table when genetic change occurs over any substantial period of time), hence 
that they are (their changes) adaptive. If 2) environmental effects on non- 
heritable trait variations can be shown to cause them to be more reproductive 
for their bearers than alternatives produced in other environments, espe- 
cially when those environmental variations can legitimately be inferred to 
be the ones experienced during the organism’s recent history then our con- 
fidence about the adaptiveness of the variations is further elevated. The 
combination of these two aspects of traits is all that can be meant by “evi- 
dence of design by selection.” There are no other ways to determine adap- 
tiveness. 
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There is one more possibility of a way out of the arguments posed above, 
and that is for the supporter of the original statement to insist that traits 
must be defined in such fashion as to exclude environmentally induced varia- 
tions from the concept of “variations in traits,” and claim that the only 
“trait” involved in calluses or learning or the other examples listed above 
is the underlying ability to produce environmentally induced variations, in 
other words, to insist that the only trait involved in calluses is the (presum- 
ably evolved) potential of an organism’s epithelium to produce variations in 
its thickness of the sort we term calluses, not the calluses themselves or 
even the pattern of their production. In this case the original statement 
(above) would be applied solely to differences between organisms in their 
underlying ability or “design” to produce calluses-amounts of callus or 
patterning of calluses. The actual patterning of calluses would not be referred 
to as adaptive, only differences in the potential for such patterning, revealed, 
nevertheless, only through studying differences in actual patterning of cal- 
luses. The concept of adaptive patterning could in this way be restricted to 
heritable differences. 
Similarly, one could consider only differences in abilities to learn- 
speed or ease of learning different things at different times or in different 
circumstances. In this fashion all trait variations that are environmentally 
induced would be eliminated from the discussion of “adaptation,” even 
though the only way to study underlying phenotypic potentials (adaptive 
designs) is to examine and evaluate the significance of their outcomes (such 
outcomes are what causes the underlying potentials to persist, disappear, 
or change). 
While I regard all useful efforts to identify, characterize, and understand 
the actual phenotypic potentials that evolve through natural selection as 
extremely important, to follow the direction of definition I have just outlined 
in discussing adaptive or reproductive significance would restrict us, in the 
case of, for example, body size differences, to those differences demon- 
strated to exist when environmental conditions were rendered identical, as 
in a laboratory experiment (in other words, to differences known to be her- 
itable); in effect, field-observed differences (those in the environments of 
selection, but for which heritability is unknown) would become irrelevant. 
The reason for the restriction would not be an effort to refine the concept 
of adaptation, or to deal better with which expressions of the phenotype 
have been saved because they have influenced reproduction favorably (as 
the original statement strongly implies), but rather an effort to locate and 
understand heritability and to define “trait” for purposes other than to un- 
derstand adaptiveness. Heritability is a difficult concept that deserves at- 
tention, but probing its nature is not the only way, and most likely not the 
best way, to discover reproductive significance or infer its history. How to 
define trait is also a useful question, primarily in the context of how natural 
selection and the vagaries of genetic fate have managed together to organize 
and divide up the organism (that is, how the particulateness of heredity 
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relates to the unitariness of ontogeny); it affects studies of adaptation in the 
sense that it bears upon how hereditary and ontogenetic contributions to the 
phenotype lead to the ultimate expressions of the phenotype. Adaptation 
includes the question of how actual expressions of the phenotype (not merely 
phenotypic potentials) maximize reproduction and how they are designed 
to do that. 
Although it is obviously possible to place the kind of restricted meaning 
I have just described on the notion of adaptation, for adaptationists it seems 
to serve little purpose except to require the creation of new vocabulary, and, 
incidentally (I hope it is always merely incidental), to denigrate most, in- 
cluding, in my view, all of the best, published studies relevant to evolutionary 
adaptation, as the concept is currently treated by those most directly con- 
cerned with the effects of natural selection. There seems to be an opinion 
that restricting the concept of adaptation to “heritable” traits is a matter of 
cleansing biology of a lot of careless thinking about natural selection. This 
notion may have been generated partly because some groups of biologists 
were studying ontogenies and morphologies, and tried to figure how legit- 
imately to divide up the phenotype so as to use it for purposes such as 
inferring branching sequences (actually, how natural selection and the other 
processes of evolution have divided up, or organized, the phenotype). For 
such people, environmentally induced trait variations would simply repre- 
sent trouble, a source of confusion and possible error. Adaptive (reproduc- 
tive) significance would be secondary to their interests, even though they 
might be able to convince themselves that the traits on which they ultimately 
focused were the real adaptations of the organism because they would be 
trying to be certain that traits as they studied them had firm and irrefutable 
ontogenetic and morphological (hence, genetic) underpinnings. In other 
words they might feel that they were “closer” to the things that were actually 
being saved by selection (I hope it is clear by now that in one way they 
would be, and in another way they would not). For their purposes it might 
seem appropriate to eliminate from consideration all environmentally in- 
duced phenotypic variations; indeed, the current environment is irrelevant 
to their interests, they are entirely concerned with inferring effects from past 
environments. The same view, however, is not likely to generate among 
those who concentrate on trying to understand how selection affects the 
phenotype with respect to reproductive effects. For these people environ- 
mentally induced trait variations-phenotypic plasticities-are necessarily 
the initial and central source of information. 
There will probably always be difficulties in intellectual cross-fertiliz- 
ation when diverse groups of biologists try to make words mean strictly what 
causes them to be most useful for each of their own endeavors. Disagree- 
ments based primarily on language are especially unfortunate when the basic 
question is not language but the problems of understanding such astonish- 
ingly complex issues as (in this case) the raison d’etre, the ontogenetic un- 
folding, and the reproductive significance of the phenotype. Traits (and the 
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environment) are ultimately our only sources of insight into these problems, 
and traits are, after all, expressions of the phenotype. Phenotypes are the 
diverse outcomes of what actually happens in nature at all stages of devel- 
opment; they are not merely potentials. Moreover, phenotypic expressions 
relevant to evolutionary adaptation are not typically produced in the labo- 
ratory, and are not easily identified as adaptive except in the field. Natural 
selection creates adaptations by its effects on ultimate phenotypic expres- 
sions; and the potentials that give rise, ontogenetically and otherwise, to 
those expressions are saved, lost, or modified as a result of the way ultimate 
expressions of the phenotype (environmentally induced or not) fare in natural 
environments. 
One group of biologists, behavioral ecologists (some have called those 
who focus on humans “Darwinian anthropologists”), begins with obser- 
vations on the reproductive significance of phenotypic outcomes and works 
“backward” toward the interaction of genes and phenotypes during onto- 
geny in the setting up of those phenotypic outcomes. A second, more re- 
cently generated group (those who work with humans call themselves “Dar- 
winian psychologists”) believe that they are more concerned with ontogeny 
and physiology (underlying design of adaptiveness) than the first group; they 
concentrate on trying to study the details of learning mechanisms and such 
things (but they too, of course, have to begin with behavior and evidence 
of its reproductive significance). A third group (of biologists) begins with 
morphologies and physiologies that underlie ultimate (usually behavioral) 
phenotypic expressions and also works toward understanding ontogeny and 
the makeup of the whole organism, but for the purpose of tracing evolu- 
tionary pattern more than process. In the end we’ll all have to learn to be 
tolerant of one another’s approaches, and to establish a common vocabulary 
and understanding of concepts. If we are lucky we may be able to do this 
without having to believe that the others are charlatans or are not doing 
useful work. 
Ironically, in view of the original statement that elicited this tirade, some 
of the actual cases in which we are likely to be most in doubt about whether 
or not variations in traits are adaptive (derived from a history of natural 
selection) are not those in which the differences are environmentally induced 
but those in which they are heritable, in simple fashions such as when a 
single allele has mutated (and especially when it has not been determined if 
each variant is more reproductive in its bearer than would be one of its 
alternative states). 
Returning to the example of body size variations, I conclude that Berg- 
mann’s Rule can legitimately be invoked whether interspecific or intra- 
specific variations are being discussed, and whether those variations, either 
intraspecific or interspecific, are environmentally induced or owing to ge- 
netic differences between populations. Although this may be true, it is worth 
noting that when variations suggesting Bergmann’s Rule occur across a range 
extensive in relation to the vagility of the individuals of the species it is 
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reasonable to expect genetic variations correlating with the phenotypic varia- 
tions. There are two reasons: first, geographically different populations are 
not likely to benefit from being able each to deal with all of the different 
sets of environmental conditions they experience only separately, so are not 
likely to evolve environmentally induced phenotypic gradiants or alterna- 
tives in that context. Second, geographic isolation tends to result in different 
gene combinations, even when selection causes the different combinations 
to produce similar phenotypes. 
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